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This dissertation examines the trade reform experience in South Africa's (SA) manufacturing
sector during the ¯rst post apartheid decade, from 1994 until 2004. During this period
SA implemented an intensive trade reform policy particularly in the manufacturing sector.
Average Nominal Tari® Rates and average E®ective Tari® Rates decreased from pre-reform
levels of 20% and 48% respectively in 1993 to 7% and 13% in 2004, with large dispersions
across the di®erent sub-industries. The core of this work explores the impact of this trade
reform on the sector's labour and product market.
We note the signi¯cant amount of recent research focusing on SA. The importance of SA
does not only stem from its special political setup. SA is an interesting case study in light
of its particular status as a developing country. A common misrepresentation is categorizing
the country as a developed economy. This misconception is attributed to its speci¯c features
that resemble developed economies, such as: GDP per capita levels of USD 11,110 (in PPP),
higher than that reported for Latin American, North African and Sub Saharan countries that
average to USD 7,014 , USD 4,500 and USD 2,792 respectively. Additionally the country
has a thriving manufacturing sector that accounts for 20% of GDP, and an average rate of
unionization of 35% which is comparable to levels is developed economies. Yet SA exhibits
compelling developing country features. It ranks 121 out of 177 in the Human development
indicator for 2006, lower than El Salvador, Nicaragua, Algeria, Honduras and Egypt. The
Gini Index indicates higher levels of inequality than in Brazil, Mexico, Egypt and Argentina.
The portion of South Africans living under the poverty line of USD 2 a day is 34%, much
higher than in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Algeria and Morocco. Life expectancy is lower
than in Bolivia, Egypt and Colombia, while health expenditure per capita is below that in
Uruguay, Brazil and Lebanon. Furthermore, unemployment rates are estimated as high as
30%, while 50% of the workforce is de¯ned as unskilled labour. In light of these characteristics
it is natural to witness the attention dedicated by development economists to SA, particularly
in light of the gold mine of macro and micro data available for long time periods, a scarce
feature for developing countries.
In this dissertation We examine three novel questions regarding the impact of trade policy
in SA. In Chapter 1 Do Unions Matter? Trade Reform and Manufacturing Wages in South
Africa I investigate the e®ect of nominal tari® cuts on industry wage di®erentials using labor
3
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force data for the period from 1995 to 2004. This study extends the existing literature in
two respects: ¯rstly, we control for the potential e®ect of labor market institutions, such as
collective bargaining power, in assessing the relationship between tari®s and industry wages.
Secondly, we account for general equilibrium e®ects by controlling for the impact of changes
in e®ective tari®s rates. We ¯nd that on the one hand, only wages in industries with levels of
unionization beyond a certain threshold were adversely a®ected by tari® cuts. This negative
e®ect is exacerbated by the extent of sectoral union power. The reported large magnitudes
of the tari® impact on wages is in line with the considerably high markups documented for
South Africa. On the other hand we ¯nd some evidence suggesting that wages in industries
with union power below the threshold were positively a®ected by the tari® cuts.
In Chapter 2 E±ciency Gains from Trade Reform: Foreign Input Technology or Import
Competition? Evidence from South Africa we extend the empirical trade literature examining
the e®ect of trade reform, proxied by the reductions in Nominal Tari® Rates (NTR), on pro-
ductivity, the latter estimated as the production function residual. We examine the di®erent
channels by which tari® cuts a®ect productivity growth. In the context of the South African
trade reform experience, using industry level data for the manufacturing sector and covering
the reform period from 1994 to 2004, we disentangle the di®erential e®ect of increased foreign
competition, proxied by reductions in NTR, and that of the imported technology, proxied by
the reductions in Input Tari® Rates (ITR), on productivity growth. Our measure of e±ciency
growth controls for the e®ect of tari® reductions on markups. The results suggest that the ef-
¯ciency di®erence between foreign and domestic inputs have the major e®ect on productivity
gains. Declines in ITR signi¯cantly raise productivity growth compared to an insigni¯cant
e®ect for NTR. Additionally, we ¯nd that higher protection rates are associated with higher
markups, albeit this ¯nding is not robust across all speci¯cations.
In Chapter 3 Heterogenous Trade Barrier E®ects: What Can We Learn From a Disag-
gregated Gravity Model? we relax the unrealistic assumption commonly imposed in gravity
model estimations of equal elasticity of trade °ows with respect to trade barriers across sectors
and regions by using disaggregated industry level trade °ows for South Africa's manufactur-
ing sector and we test for heterogenous elasticities due to: (1) variations in the level of ¯rm
heterogeneity across sectors, and (2) di®erences in the size of trading partners. In line with
theoretical predictions we ¯nd that the negative elasticity of exports to trade barriers in-
creases for sectors with a higher level of ¯rm homogeneity, supporting international trade
models with heterogenous ¯rms. Furthermore, we ¯nd that the negative elasticity of imports
to trade barriers decreases for trading partners with larger export potential, emphasizing the
objective of minimizing ¯xed costs of trading that is related to the number of countries with
which South Africa, as an importer, trades.
Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 





Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/27455Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/27455Chapter 1
Do Unions Matter? Trade Reform
and Manufacturing Wages
1.1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the impact of the tari® reductions in South Africa (SA) on worker
wages in the manufacturing sector during a period of intensive trade reform. From 1995 to
2004 the country witnessed considerable tari® cuts. Average Nominal Tari® Rates (NTR) and
average E®ective Tari® Rates (ETR) in the manufacturing sector decreased from pre-reform
levels of 20% and 48% respectively in 1993 to 7% and 13% in 2004, with large dispersions
across the di®erent sub-industries. This paper extends the existing literature that investigates
the e®ect of trade liberalization on wages premiums along two lines. Firstly, our work is the
¯rst to control for the e®ect of collective bargaining on wages when examining the trade-wage
relationship. We hypothesize an asymmetric e®ect of tari® reductions on industry wages due
to inter-industry di®erences in union bargaining power. Accounting for collective bargaining
is particularly relevant in the case of SA given the central role played by trade unions. We
support our hypothesis by outlining theoretical models that: (1) suggest a correlation between
trade policy and industry bargaining power, and (2) predict an asymmetric industry response
to trade openness based on di®erences in sectoral bargaining power. Secondly, in addition
to using NTR as the proxy to measure changes in trade policy, our paper provides more
evidence on general equilibrium e®ects as we control for changes in ETR. The latter measure
captures the total impact of trade protection in an industry by accounting for both tari®s on
¯nal output and on intermediate inputs, accordingly ETR re°ect the input linkages across
industries.
Combining, both, household and labor force data for SA from 1995 to 2004 we exploit the
variation in tari® rates, union power and wages, across industries and over time, to investigate
7
Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/274558CHAPTER 1. DO UNIONS MATTER? TRADE REFORM AND MANUFACTURING WAGES
the asymmetric e®ect of tari® cuts on wages attributed to heterogeneities in sectoral bargain-
ing power. Our results suggest that the negative impact of tari® cuts on wage premiums is
only conditional on the extent of the industry's union bargaining power, the latter proxied
by sectoral union density. There is a threshold level of union density after which tari® reduc-
tions lead to signi¯cant wage declines. An increase in union bargaining power beyond this
threshold is associated with a an even larger negative impact of tari® cuts on wages. We ¯nd
that the magnitude of the negative impact of tari® cuts on wages is considerably large when
compared to ¯ndings in the literature for other countries. This large e®ect is not surprising in
light of the signi¯cantly large markups documented for SA, which are twice those reported for
the US and higher than those documented for OECD countries (Fedderke et al 2006, Aghion
et al 2006). Accordingly our results are consistent with the notion that wage adjustment is
larger where wages exceed competitive market levels. Furthermore, we ¯nd some evidence
suggesting that industries with union power below the threshold witnessed a rise in wages as
displayed by the positive coe±cient on the interaction of tari®s and union density and by the
negative coe±cient on the tari® variable. Particularly for SA it is important to note the well
documented political reasoning behind unionization which is primarily motivated by histori-
cal racial concerns as opposed to the commonly known economic objectives of trade unions
(Azam & Rospabe 2007). In light of the latter and given our focus on assessing the role of
industry-level unionization, as opposed to worker union membership status, in the trade-wage
relationship, and additionally given our control for workers' race in our regressions, we treat
industry-level unionization as exogenous to workers' wages.
In this work we also account for concerns with regard to the endogeneity of trade protec-
tion as suggested by theories of political economy predicting that product and labor market
concerns are likely to be the basis for the chosen trade polices. We show that our results
are not driven by this endogeneity bias. Firstly, we argue that the structure of the tari®
schedule reveals limited industry selectivity in tari® cuts. This is demonstrated in the tari®
data which show that industries with higher initial tari® levels proportionately witnessed the
larger tari® reductions. This feature of the tari® series emphasizes that industry lobbying
were restricted as all tari®s approached commonly low levels. Albeit, we still account for the
plausible endogeneity of trade policy by: (1) considering the e®ect of one period lag tari®s
in our estimation, (2) controlling for unobserved industry time invariant characteristics by
including industry ¯xed e®ects, and (3) we use pre-sample (and pre-reform) 1993 tari® levels
and their interaction with the foreign exchange rate, or alternatively with gold prices, as
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instruments for the changes in tari® rates.
Gaston and Tre°er (1994) is one of the ¯rst attempts to explore the direct link between
tari®s and industry wage premiums. Using data for the US manufacturing sector in 1983 they
¯nd a negative e®ect of NTR cuts on wages. With respect to developing countries Currie &
Harrison (1997) and Revenga (1997) are the earliest studies addressing this same relationship.
Focusing on Morocco, Currie & Harrison (1997) ¯nd that NTR cuts had an insigni¯cant e®ect
on wages, while Revenga (1997) shows that Mexican NTR reductions were associated with
signi¯cant reductions in wages. In more recent studies Goldberg et al (2005) and Pavcnik et al.
(2004) examine the evolution of industry wage premiums in Colombia and Brazil, respectively,
following the cuts in NTR. Controlling for industry speci¯c e®ects, Goldberg et al. ¯nd that
industries facing higher tari® cuts experienced larger reductions in wages. Pavcnik et al. ¯nd
instead tari®s to be insigni¯cant in explaining period variations in wage premiums in Brazil.
Similar work is conducted on India (Mishra and Kumar, 2005; Vasudeva-Dutta, 2004), Mexico
(Feliciano, 2001), the Philippines (Hasan and Chen, 2004) and Poland (Goh and Javorcik,
2004). With respect to India, results from the former work support that trade liberalization
induced higher ¯rm productivity leading to higher wage premiums. Vasudeva-Dutta (2004)
using a di®erent dataset ¯nds the opposite. Results on Mexico and the Philippines are
similar to those reported for the Brazilian experience suggesting the insigni¯cant tari®-wage
relationship. As for Poland, ¯ndings from Goh and Javorcik (2004) show that NTR reductions
are associated with higher wages. Finally, using manufacturing census data for Indonesian
¯rms, Amiti and Davis (2008) study the impact of reductions in both output and input tari®s
on wages. The paper shows that cuts in output tari®s lower wages in import competing ¯rms
while boost wages in exporting ¯rms. Moreover reductions in input tari®s increase wages in
import-using ¯rms relative to ¯rms that source inputs locally.
Some of the recent empirical trade literature focuses on the role of industry bargaining
power in determining the impact of changes in trade policy on labor market outcomes. How-
ever, these studies refer to developed economies and only make use of trade policy outcomes,
as opposed to policy instruments, as the proxy to measure trade openness. Macpherson and
Steward (1990) study the impact of changes in imports on unionized versus non-unionized
wages in the US. They ¯nd that increases in imports were associated with reductions in wages
and that a high level of industry unionization decreases the negative impact of increased im-
port competition on wages. Freeman and Katz (1991) compare the responsiveness of US
wages to sales shocks resulting from international trade across industries with di®erent levels
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of unionization. They ¯nd that wages were more responsive to sales shocks in the highly
unionized industries. A more recent study by Gri±th et al. (2005) analyze whether the
e®ect of product market competition on real wages depends on the level of collective bar-
gaining power. Using data on OECD countries they ¯nd that lower mark-ups, which re°ect
the increase in foreign competition, led to higher real wages. Yet their results show that
the interaction between the union density variable and industry mark-ups was positive and
signi¯cant, suggesting that the positive e®ect of reduced mark-ups on wages decreases in the
presence of higher bargaining power.
This paper is divided into seven sections. In the next section we introduce SA's trade
policy and unionization background. In Section 3 we outline the relevant theoretical models.
Section 4 describes both the labor force and trade data on hand. Section 5 presents the
empirical methodology. Section 6 discusses our results. And ¯nally Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Country Background
1.2.1 Trade History
Up until 1970s SA was ¯rmly oriented towards Import Substitution Industrialization . The
latter consisted of a wide-ranging system of Quantitative Restrictions (QR) as opposed to
tari®-based protection. The ¯rst shift away from this trade regime came in 1972 with the
relaxation of QR and the introduction of an Export Development Assistance scheme, however
the overall trade policy remained protectionist. In the mid 1980s SA faced balance of payment
pressures arising from a debt crisis which led to the implementation of import surcharges which
o®set the e®ects of the QR relaxation that continued into the 1990s and were completed by
1994. Moreover in 1990 the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) was introduced granting
subsidy to exporters based on their export value.1
In April 1994, the ¯rst post-apartheid government led by the African National Congress
(ANC) party was democratically elected. The ANC party was strongly supported by Congress
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest labor federation in SA. This ANC-
COSATU alliance explains why many of the trade union leaders became prominent members
of the new government. Simultaneously, multilateral trade reform was initiated in 1994 with
the WTO agreeing on the phase-down tari® plan o®ered by SA in the GATT/WTO Uruguay
Round. By signing the latter agreement the country committed to signi¯cantly reducing
1See Bell 1997 for a more detailed description of SA Trade Policy
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tari® rates. Consequently during the period from January 1st 1995 onwards SA experienced
considerable cuts in protection rates. Furthermore, the same period was associated with the
decision to phase out of GEIS where by 1997 the export subsidy provided under the GEIS
was terminated.
Investigating trade liberalization episodes across developing countries, Michaely et al.
(1991) ¯nd that radical political changes towards more stable regimes are usually accompanied
by adopting free trade policies. Di®erently, for SA it is believed that the support of the
country's Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) for trade policy reform was a result
of the anticipated change in the regime. The IDC believed that committing to the trade
reform would limit the intervention of the ANC-COSATU led government in the country's
industrial development and would restrict the power of trade unions in determining the course
of economic development in the post-apartheid era. Contrary to expectations, the ANC-
COSATU alliance coming to power in 1994, proved to hold an anti-protectionist stand as
they actively conformed to the stipulated tari® reduction schedule. As documented in Bell
(1997) the new government's liberal position was triggered by their plan of reducing consumer
prices and raising industrial e±ciencies by curbing domestic monopoly power and the control
of conglomerates that had vested interests in the prevalent protectionist policies. 2
1.2.2 Unionization History
A prominent feature of the South African labor market is its high rate of unionization. Based
on our dataset, the economy wide unionization rate averaged 35% in the period from 1995
to 2004. Of this percentage 70% were black & 64% male. This rate of unionization ¯gure is
fairly high when compared to the average rates in developing countries estimated at 20%, and
is more in line with ¯gures for developed countries estimated at 40% for OECD countries.
Another feature of the South African trade unions that resembles developed countries concerns
union membership wage premiums which are estimated to range from 10% to 24%, comparable
to 10% reported for UK and 15% for the US (Aidt et al, 2002).
Collective bargaining in SA takes place at, both, a centralized and a decentralized level.
The centralized level operates under Bargaining Councils (BC).3 BC agreements are estab-
lished when registered employer associations voluntarily agree to bargain with registered trade
unions. The agreements cover a speci¯c industry, occupation, geographic location (Bendix
2A thorough characterization of the tari® structure will be presented in Section 4.
3Prior to the new labor relations act of 1995 BC were known as Industrial Councils
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1989) and operate under ergo omnes rules 4. BC agreements can not be established unless
they represent the majority of workers in the agreement's area of speci¯cation and would
represent the majority of employers. Di®erently, decentralized bargaining takes place at the
¯rm level (Azam et al, 2007). The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),
established in 1985, is by far the biggest and most e®ective of the country's three main labor
federations. Based on the 8th Congress Organizational Review, average union rates declined
since 1997 from a rate of 36% to 32% in 2003. This erosion of membership is believed to
be due to the massive layo®s as unemployment rates increased from 22% in 1997 to reach a
maximum of 30.5% in 2003 (Source: IMF).
To capture the centralized and decentralized collective bargaining e®ect on wages it would
be ideal to have information on the union status of the establishment to which the worker
belongs and whether workers in the establishment are covered by a BC agreement. Such
data are not available. In place we use worker union membership status, as provided by the
household surveys, to derive our proxy for industry-level union bargaining power which is
computed as the union density of an industry. With regard to the BC centralized e®ect on
wages, we capture the latter by the industry, occupational and regional dummies.
With regard to the endogeneity of industry-level unionization to workers wages, we argue
that given the particularity of SA and the race motivated history underlying unionization, we
dismiss the latter as a concern in our estimations.5 The latter concern is further reduced in
light of our focus on assessing the role of industry-level unionization, as opposed to worker
union membership status, in the trade-wage relationship.
1.3 Theoretical Background
In this section we start by outlining the theoretical argument supporting the correlation
between trade policy and industry union power. We rely on this theoretical framework to
emphasize the potential omitted variable bias that stems from not controlling for industry
unionization as the latter is likely to a®ect industry wages independently from the impact
of tari®s. Given the focus of this paper we do not argue in favor of a particular causal re-
lationship between trade policy and union power. We merely highlight the presence of a
strong correlation between the latter variables. Secondly, we outline theories predicting the
4Meaning that wage agreements extend to all workers covered by the area of the agreement whether union-
ized or not. (Butcher & Rouse 2001)
5Refer to Azam & Rospabe (2007) for a more thorough discussion on the racial history of trade unions in
SA.
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di®erential e®ect of trade policy on wages attributed to heterogeneities in the level of indus-
try bargaining power which supports our hypothesis of a signi¯cant role for the interaction
between tari® reductions and union power.
1.3.1 The Correlation Between Trade Policy and Industry Union Power
Union Density, de¯ned as the number of unionized employees in a speci¯c industry over total
employment of that industry, is the popular proxy for union bargaining power. Hirsch &
Schumacher (2002) discuss two primary channels that a®ect this ratio. The ¯rst relates to
the changes in levels of union wage premiums. In the context of free trade policy, workers'
sentiment towards joining unions may change due to a perceived decline in union bargaining
power resulting from trade induced reductions in industry rents. Alternatively, employers op-
position towards employing unionized workers can adversely a®ect the ratio given the negative
e®ect of unions on pro¯ts (Addison & Hirsch 1989). Additionally, the increasing threat of
international capital mobility, induced by the rising trends of globalization, raises employers
anti-unionization sentiment as it becomes easier to relocate businesses to new markets with
more °exible labor regulations (Farber & Western 2000). The second channel takes place
through alterations in the labor market structure due to shifts in labor demand or supply
associated with changes in trade policy. These can take the form of changes in industry,
occupation, demographic structure, or regional location of jobs. In the framework of trade
reform, trade openness may increase employment of labor segments that are traditionally less
likely to be unionized such as skilled labor or female workers. For instance, an increase in
skilled employment can be stimulated by trade induced Skill Biased Technological Changes,
whereas rises in female participation can be due to labor reform which is likely to go hand in
hand with trade reforms.
Arguing the reverse relationship where collective bargaining a®ects trade policy decisions,
Rama (1997), motivated by the strikes in Zambia, Nigeria and Venezuela that led to reversing
reform programs, develops a model based on a two-stage game between the government &
organized labor to determine the level of product market distortions proxied by import tari®
rates. The model predicts that organized labor is more willing to cooperate (as opposed to
strike) the larger is the percentage of the labor force enrolled in trade unions. A similar
result is presented in Rama & Tabellini (1998). The underlying logic is that workers gain
from higher import tari®s in their own sector but as consumers they are better o® if tari®s
for all other sectors are low. Accordingly if trade unions are narrowly de¯ned, their members
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bene¯t greatly from tari® barriers and wage di®erentials while imposing only a light burden on
each individual consumer. But as the number of bene¯ciaries from the distortions increases,
the burden gets heavier leading organized workers to internalize (as consumers) part of the
resulting e±ciency losses. This follows from the logic of Virtues of Corporatism.
1.3.2 Models of Trade, Collective Bargaining and Industry Wages
Under the assumption of perfect competition the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin Model predicts
a heterogenous e®ect of trade policy on industry wages on the basis of sectoral di®erences in
worker speci¯c characteristics. Alternatively, under the Speci¯c Factor Model winners and
losers of trade are directly identi¯ed by their industry a±liation. Abstracting from a world of
perfect competition, theories of imperfect markets such as E±ciency Wage and Rent-Sharing
allow for wide inter-industry wage dispersions o®ering alternative channels through which free
trade policies can impact industry returns.
In the presence of collective bargaining, rent-sharing models constitute the relevant theo-
retical framework. Monopolistic Competition in the product market determines size of indus-
try rents. Bargaining power in the Labor Market determines the distribution of rents between
workers and the ¯rm. In an e±cient bargaining framework, the higher an industry's union
power the more it is able to capture portions of rents in the form of higher wages for their
unionized workers. Freeman and Medo® (1981) and Hirsch and Neufeld (1987) show that the
ability of unions to negotiate higher wages for unionized workers is a positive function of the
degree of unionization. This positive impact of unions may further extend to also a®ect wages
of non-unionized workers if the threat or demand e®ect o®set the supply e®ect (Hirsch and
Addison, 1986). Consequently, one would expect a higher wage mark-up in industries with
stronger union representations.
Furthermore, trade union theory suggests that unions are able to capture excess rent
in the presence of protection (Lawrence and Lawrence, 1985). With the increase in foreign
competition induced by free trade policies and consequently the compression of industry rents,
unions face a trade-o® between lower employment and lower wages and thus may bargain for
employment guarantees at the expense of accepting wage concessions. This notion is more
formally presented in Freeman & Katz (1991). Moreover, Abowd and Lemieux (1991) show
that if international competition adversely a®ects total quasi rents6 available to both the
employer and unions, then either wage settlement or union employment will be negatively
6The di®erence between net revenues and cost of employment.
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a®ected. Interestingly, Grossman (1984) presents a model in which the opposite may occur.
He ¯nds that majority voting in unions coupled with a seniority system for layo®s and rehires
lead to sticky wages which do not adjust to intensi¯ed international competition, thereby
emphasizing the important role of the seniority structure of unions in determining union
wage response to trade reform.
In light of the above discussion we believe that there is ample reason in support of account-
ing for industrial collective bargaining when investigating wage responsiveness to changes in
trade policy.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Labor Force Data
In this paper we use repeated cross section labor force data from two independent surveys
provided by the South African Data Archive (SADA). The ¯rst is the annual October House-
hold Survey (OHS) which runs from 1993 to 1999. We exclude three rounds ; the 1993 OHS
being a pilot survey with insu±cient information on workers' industry a±liation, the 1994
OHS whose information we ¯nd unreliable7 and the 1996 OHS due to the absence of the wage
remuneration point values as wages are reported in income intervals. The second dataset we
use is from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) which starts in 2000. The latter is a twice-yearly
rotating panel conducted in February and September of each year. In our study we use the
September wave. Matching both datasets we are able to cover nine years of the trade reform
period, from 1995 to 2004 (excluding 1996).
Our dataset covers all of South Africa's nine provinces and in this respect is representative
of the country's labor market. We restrict our sample to workers in the manufacturing sector
of age 15 to 65 with reported monthly wages between 100 and 30,000 Rands. Given the focus of
the paper on the relationship between tari®s, wages and union power, we exclude self employed
workers. Consequently we are left with a sample of 17,329 observations which vary from a
maximum of 2,965 in 1995 to a minimum of 1,036 for 1998. With regard to our dependent
variable, the wage remuneration question `what is total salary/pay (including overtime) at
main job (before deductions)' does not change throughout both surveys. We are unable to
7We ¯nd that the wage distribution and sample composition for 1994 is considerably di®erent from both:
that of 1993 (using the South African Labor and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) dataset also known as
the Living Standard Life Survey (LSMS)) and that of the proceeding years. We do not use the SALDRU 1993
data in our analysis as it does not provide worker sub-industry a±liation within the manufacturing industry.
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report hourly wages given the lack of information on the number of hours usually worked in
the 1995 survey accordingly we are forced to use monthly wages.8 We control for workers'
age, household size and for whether the individual is a male, head of household and single.
We break the sample into three racial groups black, others and white the latter being the
regression Omitted Category (OC). Controlling for workers' race is particularly important in
this study given the racial motivation underlying union membership in SA. Using information
on the highest completed level of education we construct ¯ve education classi¯cations: no
schooling (OC), not completed primary schooling, completed primary schooling, completed
secondary schooling and completed a university degree or above. We further control for
geographic location by distinguishing 9 provinces. We de¯ne 9 occupational categories, and
we report only 10 categories for workers' industry a±liation for two reason: ¯rstly, due to the
lack of more detailed industry a±liation information for the 1995 OHS. Secondly, to ensure
that we have a fair number of observations under each industry at every point in time. Table
1 shows the breakdown of the occupation and industry categories.
Examining the evolution of wages during the period, there is a general decline in both the
mean and the median of log monthly wages, particularly during the ¯rst three years of the
period. This decline is further con¯rmed by the leftward shift in the wage distribution (see
Figure 1). We use the survey information on workers' union membership status to construct
our industry union density (UD) variable computed as the percentage of union members in a
particular industry of the total workers employed in this industry. The union status question
`is ... a member of a trade union?' does not change through out the surveys ensuring the
time consistency of our union power estimate. The yearly average union density across all 10
manufacturing industries exhibits a declining trend (Figure 2). Based on our data, the period
average rate of unionization in the manufacturing sector is estimated at 43% (of which: 66%
male, 68% African). We ¯nd highest rates of 55% and 47% for TRANS and TEX sectors
respectively, and a lowest of 27% for the NoMet sector.9
8Excluding 1995 from the estimation is costly given that tari® rates were substantially reduced between
1994 and 1997
9Refer to Table 1 for abbreviations.
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1.4.2 Tari® and Industry Level Data
Regarding the tari® data, we use NTR and ETR provided in Edwards (2005).10 The original
data series is at the SIC-3 digit level. For the reason previously noted we aggregate our tari®
data to 10 industries using the 1993 pre-sample imports as weights. Table 2 summarizes
the tari® data. Average NTR decreased from 19.62% in 1993 to 6.68% in 2004 while ETR
declined from 47.75% to 12.79%. Notably the ¯rst three years of the reform witnessed the
highest reductions in protection rates where by 1997 average tari®s had reached less than 50%
of their 1993 pre-reform value. Moreover the decline in yearly standard deviation indicates
the decreasing dispersion in the cross industry levels of protection as they approach commonly
low levels. Figures 3-A and 3-B plot the pre-sample tari® rates in 1993 against the change
in tari®s between 1993 and 2004.11 The downward sloping graph indicates that industries
with initially high levels of protection experienced more severe liberalization measures. This
feature of the data implies that industry selectivity reduction or lobbying were to some extent
limited during the reform.
We use data on capital, employment, exports and imports from the South African Stan-
dardized Industry Database - SASID (Quantec Research, 2006) to control for industry char-
acteristics. We aggregate the SIC-3 digit data to our 10 industry categorizations to match
our labor force data. GDP ¯gures at the 10 industry classi¯cation are obtained from the
GDP annual reports provided by Statistics South Africa's (STATSSA) . Using this data we
construct variables that measure trade °ows such as: export intensity and import penetration
ratios.12 In our regressions we also control for changes in international prices. There is no
available direct measure for the international prices faced by the South African consumers,
accordingly and in line with Currie & Harrison (1997) we use the US export price index series
calculated by the Division of International Prices at the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. We
roughly create a concordance between the US export price series which is provided at the
Harmonized System (HS) classi¯cation and our industry categorization. We also use South
Africa's export price index provided by Quantech as another proxy for international prices.
Under the assumption that export prices of South African producers are solely determined
by the international market, we consider that the latter proxy is exogenous to worker wages.
10We use the tari® data computed using scheduled tari® rates and inclusive of surcharges. A detailed
description of the methodology adopted for the tari® calculations is provided in the paper.
11We compute the tari® changes, e ¢, as noted in Table 2.
12Export Intensity = Exports=GDP, Import Penetration = Imports=(GDP + Imports ¡ Exports).
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1.5 Empirical Methodology
In this section we outline the two empirical techniques implemented in this paper to estimate
the e®ect of reductions in NTR and ETR on wages, controlling for the role of collective
bargaining. The ¯rst procedures entails estimating an expanded Mincerian wage regression.
With regard to the second technique, we adopt a two stage estimation framework that enables
estimating the latter relationship in First-Di®erence which accordingly allows using pre-reform
tari® levels in 1993 as an instrument for tari® changes.
1.5.1 One-Stage Estimation Procedure
We estimate an expanded Mincerian wage regression, equation (1), in which we regress real
log monthly wages, wj
13, on a matrix of worker characteristics, Q14, NTR and ETR (¿), union
density ratio (UD), the interaction of the latter (¿ ¤UD), and a matrix of other industry and
trade related controls (H). We include time dummies (TD) to absorb macroeconomic shocks
and 9 industry dummies (ID) in order to control for time invariant unobserved industry
speci¯c heterogeneities a®ecting simultaneously wages and tari®s. Moreover following Currie
& Harrison (1997), where domestic prices are given by P = P¤(1 + ¿), we control for the
international price, P¤, to account for the fact that changes in international prices may
dampen the e®ect of tari® cuts on wages.
Ln(wijt) = ¯QQijt+¯¿¿jt+¯UDUDjt+¯(¿¤UD)(¿jt¤UDjt)+¯HHjt+¯IDIDijt+¯TDTDijt+²ijt
(1.1)
The total e®ect of tari®s on wages is given by ¯¿ + ¯(¿¤UD)UD. On the one hand, if our
hypothesis is true and tari® reductions are associated with larger wage declines for the highly
unionized sectors, then we expect ¯(¿¤UD) to be positive. On the other hand, ¯¿ captures the
total e®ect of tari®s on wages for the non-unionized sectors. A negative coe±cient implies
that tari® reductions were associated with a rise in wages in those sectors.
1.5.2 Two-Stage Estimation Procedure
Theories of political economy predict that product and labor market concerns are likely to be
the basis of the implemented trade policies suggesting the endogeneity of protection. As noted
13Nominal monthly wages are de°ated using the Consumer Price Index from STATSSA.
14Age, age squared, gender, race, position in the household, marital status, provincial location, education
and occupation.
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in the introduction, we address this issue by: (1) we argue that the structure of the tari®
schedule reveals limited industry selectivity tari® reductions, (2) we consider the e®ect of one
period lag tari®s in our estimation, (3) we control for unobserved industry ¯xed characteristics
by including industry ¯xed e®ects. Finally, and as will be more thoroughly discussed in
Section 6.2, pre-sample 1993 tari® levels and their interaction with real e®ective exchange
rate, or alternatively gold prices, comprise plausible instruments for tari® changes. Notably,
that we can not estimate equation (1) in First-Di®erence as the data on hand are a repeated
cross section as opposed to a panel dataset of workers. Accordingly we adopt the Two-Stage
estimation framework commonly used in the trade and labor literature on industry premium
(Krueger and Summers 1988, Katz and Summers 1989, Gaston and Tre°er 1994, Goldberg et
al. 2004). This technique enables constructing a panel of estimated industry wage premiums
from the ¯rst stage of the procedure which allows an estimation in First-Di®erence in the
second stage. The latter is important for our purpose of instrumenting for changes in tari®s.
In the ¯rst-stage we estimate equation (2). The coe±cients on industry dummies, ¯ID, capture
the part of the variation in wages that is only explained by industry a±liation. We adopt
the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) two-step Restricted Least Square (RLS) procedure
which involves including all 10 industry dummies and estimating equation (2) subject to the
constraint (1.3), where nj is the vector of each industry's employment share. By using the
latter technique to normalize the industry wage di®erentials we avoid the dummy variable
trap which requires an omitted-control group. Hence industry coe±cients can be interpreted
as the proportional di®erence between the log monthly wage for workers in a given industry,
j, and the employment share weighted average log monthly wage of workers (with the same
observable characteristics) in all industries. Moreover, this method provides correct standard
errors for the estimated ¯ID coe±cients.15 Given that our sample is composed of independent
cross section data, we estimate equation (2) subject to (3) separately for each of the years in
the sample.
Ln(wijt) = ¯QQijt + ¯IDIDijt + ²ijt (1.2)
15Krueger & Summers (1988) used a two step re-normalization to express industry di®erentials as deviation
from an employment-weighted average. They approximate the standard errors (SE) of the reorganized coe±-
cients by the SE of the original regression coe±cients. With regard to the omitted control industry, they use
the SE of the constant term. Haisken-DeNew & Schmidt (1997) show that this procedure a®ects inference
by overstating the SE of the re-normalized coe±cients. They thus present the aforementioned one step RLS
procedure for calculating the exact SE of the re-normalized coe±cients.
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10 X
j=1
njt ¤ ¯ID;jt = 0 (1.3)
In the second-stage estimation we pool the yearly estimated industry wage premiums, ¯ID,
and regress them on tari® ratios, industry union density ratio, the interaction of the latter,
and a matrix of other industry and trade related controls. We also control for time, ¯xed
e®ects and P¤ and estimate (4) in First-Di®erence:
¢¯ID;jt = ¯¿¢¿jt + ¯UD¢UDjt + ¯(¿¤UD)¢(¿jt ¤ UDjt) + ¯H¢Hjt + ºjt (1.4)
Given that the dependent variable in the second-stage is the estimated coe±cients from the
¯rst-stage wage equation, we use the inverse of (¾2
¯j;t + ¾2
¯j;t¡1) as weights.16 This technique
allows us to assign lower weights to industries with higher variances. Accounting for gen-
eral forms of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error term, we compute robust
(Huber-White) standard errors. Under this Two-Stage methodology we can instrument for
the changes in tari® rates using initial reform tari® levels and their interaction with foreign
exchange rate and with gold prices.
1.6 Estimation Results
1.6.1 First-Stage Results for the Two-Stage Procedure
Table 3 shows the estimation results from wage equation (2) for each year of the sample.
Individual characteristics such as older age, being male, and a household head are associated
with higher wages. As one would expect, white workers earn the most and black the least.
With regard to the education variables, the estimated coe±cients are signi¯cant for most
years and across most schooling classi¯cations. Figure 4 plots the coe±cients of the four
educational dummies with respect to the omitted category being the lowest educational group
(no schooling). As demonstrated by the graph, workers belonging to the highest educational
category (completed university degree or above) earn substantially higher returns compared
to the other groups. The period average parameter for the top educational group is estimated
at 1.04 compared to parameter estimates of 0.57, 0.29 and 0.10 for workers who completed
secondary schooling, primary schooling and those who did not complete primary schooling,
respectively. Yet, unlike the Colombian experience (Goldberg 2005), South Africa's trade





¯j;t¡1 where ¯j;t & ¯j;t¡1 are assumed to be independent.
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reform period was not associated with substantial increases in returns to workers with college
education. Accounting for work characteristics by controlling for occupation and industry
a±liation considerably increases the explanatory power of the model as the period average
R-squared increases from 34.8% to 47.8%. As displayed in Table 3, the coe±cients on the
occupation dummies (OD) are signi¯cant and indicate higher premiums to the more skilled
occupations.
Regarding the estimated coe±cients on the 10 industry dummies (ID), most of the param-
eters are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The bottom row of Table 3 reports the standard
deviations (SD) of the estimated industry wage premiums weighted by industry employment












where nj is a vector of employment share in each industry, ¯j and ¾¯j are the estimated
industry premiums and their standard error, and ¯¤
j is the mean of ¯j weighted by nj (see
Moll 1993). The estimated variation ranges from 6.5% to 16% suggesting that movement
across industries has a considerable impact on wages. Notably the period is characterized by
a rise in the yearly dispersions across industry premiums as indicated by the upward trending
yearly standard deviations (see Figure 5). We compare the weighted and adjusted year to
year correlations of the industry premiums given by:
Correlation =
P












where Nj = the geometric mean= (nj;tnj;t¡1)0:5 . This measure of persistence indicates that
the pattern of cross-industry wage premiums was relatively unstable in the early past of the
sample. This non-persistent structure of industry wage di®erentials suggests the plausible
impact of trade reform on wages which was more intense in the start of the period. The
correlation ¯gures pick up to higher levels in the last ¯ve years under study during which the
reform took a smoother pace.
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1.6.2 The Mincer Equation and the Second-Stage Results
Tables 4-A and 4-B show the results for the e®ect of NTR and ETR on wages, respectively.
Columns (1) & (2) report the results from the Fixed-E®ect estimation of equation (1) in which
we directly include tari®s and union density in the Mincer wage equation. The First-Di®erence
results from the Two-Stage estimation of equation (4) are presented in columns (3) & (4).
We ¯nd a positive and signi¯cant interaction term between tari®s and union density under
almost all scenarios. This ¯nding is robust to using both NTR and ETR, and to controlling
for trade outcome measures such as the lag of the import penetration and export intensity
ratios. The use of lags alleviates endogeneity stemming from, arguably, the e®ect of labor
costs on trade °ows.
As previously mentioned, theories of political economy suggest the endogeneity of pro-
tection as product and labor market concerns are likely to be the basis upon which trade
policies are formed. A country may be more inclined to maintain high levels of protection
on industries with particular characteristics such as: higher creators of employment, high
intensity of unskilled labor, possess signi¯cant union bargaining power or have low levels of
productivity. In Section 4.2 we discussed the decreasing cross industry dispersion in levels
of protection as indicated by the declining standard deviations. This is con¯rmed in Figures
3-A and 3-b which plot the negative relation between the period changes in tari®s and pre-
reform levels showing that proportionately larger tari® cuts were witnessed in industries with
higher initial tari® level. This feature demonstrates the limited role of industry selectivity
tari® reductions or lobbying during the reform period. Generally it is not easy to ¯nd a good
instrument for tari®s, accordingly we address this concern in three di®erent ways: (1) we
employ lagged tari®s in our estimations, (2) we include industry ¯xed e®ects to control for
the unobserved ¯xed industry characteristics a®ecting, simultaneously, wages and tari®s, and
(3) we argue that 1993 pre-sample tari® rates are a good instrument for the yearly changes
in contemporaneous tari®s. Regressing the change in NTR between 1993 and 2004 on the
1993 tari® rates yields a signi¯cant coe±cient of -0.292 (t-value = 9.88) and an R2 of 76.60%
(similar results are obtained for ETR). Additionally, based on the South African government
documents, it is believed that the acceleration in the tari® reduction program was in order
to compensate for the depreciating Rand (Michie, 1997). Given that protection may respond
to exchange rate pressures, we therefore also use the interaction of real e®ective exchange
rate with 1993 tari®s as another instrument. This interaction with the yearly exchange rates
allows our instrument to vary over time. Moreover given that gold dominated the pattern of
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trade in SA in the early nineties we also use the interaction between 1993 tari®s and gold
prices as another instrument. 17
Results from using the latter IVs and their interactions with union density reported in
columns (5) to (8) further con¯rm the positive and signi¯cant interaction of tari®s and union
density. Columns (9) to (12) present results from the two estimation techniques using one
period lag tari®s instead of contemporaneous tari® rates. The latter scenario accounts for
the possibility that wage adjustments may not occur instantaneously. Furthermore, as previ-
ously noted, it partially alleviates concerns with regard to tari® endoogeneity. Results using,
both, ETR and ETR con¯rm our prior ¯ndings of a positive and signi¯cant interaction term.
Another interesting result that is important to note is the negative coe±cient on the tari®
variable under some of the estimation scenarios. This ¯nding implies that tari® cuts had a
positive e®ect on wage premiums for industries with low union power. The signi¯cance of
this e®ect is more robust to using ETR as our measure of protection.
To show the extent of our ¯ndings, we compare the e®ect of a one percentage point tari®
decline on wages in the TRANS and TEX industries which had the highest period average
rate of unionization of 55% & 47% respectively, to wages in the NoMet sector with the lowest
unionization rate of 27%. Based on ¯ndings reported in column (6) of Tables 4-A, workers
in the former two industries witnessed wage declines of 1.6% (-1.378+55%*5.372) & 1.14%
(-1.378+47%*5.372) respectively due to a one percentage point decline in NTR compared
to a wage decline of 0.07% (-1.378+27%*5.372) for workers in latter industry. Considering
the e®ect of cuts in ETR reported in Table 4-B, our results predict a wage reduction of
0.3% (-0.471+55%*1.509)& 0.23% (-0.471+47%*1.509) respectively for the TRANS & TEX
industries versus a wage increase of 0.06% (-0.471+27%*1.509) for the NoMet industry. This
impact of tari® cuts on wages is considerably large when compared to results found for
Colombia where a one percentage point cut in NTR is estimated to reduce manufacturing
wages by an average of 0.2% (Goldberg et al 2005). Yet these large e®ects are not surprising
in light of the signi¯cantly high markups in SA as documented in Fedderke et al (2006) and
Aghion et al (2006). The former work ¯nds that markups in the South African manufacturing
sector are approximately twice those reported for the US. Aghion et al (2006) show that
markups are signi¯cantly higher in the South African manufacturing industries than they are
in corresponding industries worldwide.
17A similar instrument was used in Goldberg et al (2004) where in the case of Colombia they use co®ee
prices
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We note that our previous results are not driven by a plausible collinearity between the
tari® and union density variables. Table 5-A and 5-B show the regression results of including
both tari®s and union density and excluding the interaction term. The results support an
independent and signi¯cant impact of each variable on wages. Moreover, computing the
correlation matrix between tari®s (NTR and ETR) and union density reveals a correlation
coe±cient of -0.2 between the variables in changes and of 0.40 between the variables in
levels. In Tables 6-A and 6-B we also present regression results without controlling for the
role of union bargaining power and only including the tari®s. Our estimates suggest that
tari® cuts had a negative e®ect on wages as revealed by the positive and signi¯cant tari®
coe±cient estimate. This result is robust to using NTR or ETR. To interpret our estimates
in column (6), a one-percentage point reduction in NTR and ETR translate to 0.89% and
0.12% reduction in wage premium. These ¯ndings suggest the plausible omitted variable bias
resulting from not controlling for industry heterogeneities in bargaining power.
So far we have discussed results from various estimation techniques: Fixed-E®ect, First-
Di®erence and IV, and for two speci¯cations: controlling for tari®s and international prices
and accounting for import penetration and export intensity. Our ¯ndings are also robust to
other speci¯cations in which we control for: (1) lagged values of exports and imports, (2) the
latter interacted with real e®ective exchange rate to account for the di®erential the impact of
exchange rates on industry premiums based on sectoral trade exposure, (3) sectoral capital
intensity by controlling for the capital-labor ratio, (4) we also use SA's export price index
as an alternative proxy for international prices, (5) our results are also robust to alternative
means of aggregating our tari® variable. We reported ¯ndings from using pre-sample 1993
imports as weights to aggregate the tari®s rates. Our ¯ndings are also robust to using one
period lag imports as weights or using simple averages18, (6) ¯nally, given that the potential
endogeneity of trade policy may be in response to labor market concerns such as to protect low-
skill intensive industries, we control for sectoral skill intensity using industry level employment
data on workers' skill level from Quantec.19
18It is important to note that on the one hand import weighted tari®s give negligible weight to prohibitive
tari®s given that the corresponding imports are typically low. On the other hand un-weighted average tari®
rates may assign too heavy weights to commodities that are only a small fraction of imports.
19We do not report these results as they are very similar to those already documented.
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1.7 Conclusion
Despite the number of empirical micro-data founded studies examining the e®ect of tari®
reductions on industry wage premiums in developing countries, there has been no consensus
on the nature of this relationship. Due to data limitation previous work fails to account for
labor market institutions, such as union bargaining power, in spite of the sound theoretical
foundation predicting a trade-wage-union relationship. Additionally, this literature only ad-
dresses reductions in NTR as the proxy for free trade policy. In this respect they do not
control for the impact of changes in ETR that account for the total decline in protection
levels by considering both tari®s on ¯nal output and on intermediate input in an industry.
In this paper we exploit the changes in NTR and ETR in South Africa to investigate the
role of collective bargaining in assessing the relationship between tari® changes and industry
wages. Using labor force data we cover the reform period from 1995 to 2004. Being privileged
with a dataset that includes information on worker union membership status, we are able to
control for industry union bargaining power in examining the wage-trade relationship. We
¯nd that the impact of tari®s is conditional on the industry's level of unionization. Only
industries with higher union power were negatively a®ected by tari® cuts. This result is not
surprising given that industries with stronger unions are able to accumulate larger shares of
industry rents thereby securing their workers higher wages. With increased openness and
intensi¯ed foreign competition industry rents are compressed, consequently unions have less
room to bargain for higher wages, a phenomenon that explains the widespread protectionist
sentiment across trade unions.
Policy implications based on our results, which re°ect the South African trade reform
experience, highlight the plausible role played by labor market institutions in the political
economy of free trade. Our ¯ndings suggest that implementing free trade policy in countries
with lower union power may have less of a social cost compared to more highly unionized
nations. The fact that a country has a lower level of unionization may imply that workers
are not capturing shares of economic pro¯ts, which in turn are accruing to ¯rm owners. In
such case it is probable that increased import competition would alternatively adversely a®ect
the latter group. We note that in this paper the direct e®ect of tari®s on real wages takes
place through the e®ect of free trade policy on consumer prices or on nominal wages. Other
channels of transmission can be through changes in industry productivity, producer prices or
rents. More e®orts directed towards examining these channels is encouraged. Investigating
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the latter would complement this work by fully understanding the dynamics of factor and
product market imperfections in South Africa. Furthermore we believe that more country
studies are needed to con¯rm the role of collective bargaining in the trade-wage relationship as
predicted by this paper. Finally, an interesting avenue for future research would be to exploit
the pool of existing empirical case studies for developing countries' trade reform episodes
and theoretically model the witnessed diverging outcomes of free trade policies with respect
worker wages. This challenging task would help identifying a set of pre-requisites that are
needed to minimize the adverse e®ects of embarking on trade liberalizing policies.
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1) Legislators, senior o±cials and managers. (Occupation 1)
2) Professionals. (Occupation 2)
3) Technical and associate professionals. (Occupation 3)
4) Clerks. (Occupation 4)
5) Service and market sales workers. (Occupation 5)
6) Skilled agricultural and ¯shery workers. (Occupation 6)
7) Crafts and related trades workers. (Occupation 7)
8) Plant and machine operator and assemblers. (Occupation 8)
9) Elementary workers. (Occupation 9) & (Omitted Category)
Industries:
1) Food, beverage and tobacco. (FBT)
2) Textile, clothing, leather products and footwear. (TEX)
3) Wood, paper, printing and publishing products. (WPP)
4) Coke, re¯ned petrol, chemical, rubber and plastic products. (PetChem)
5) Glass and non-metallic minerals products. (NoMet)
6) Basic iron, steel, non ferrous, metal products, machinery and equipment. (Met)
7) Electrical machinery. (EleMach)
8) TV, radio and communication, scienti¯c and professional equipment. (RadTV)
9) Motor vehicle, parts and accessories and transport products. (TRANS)
10) Furniture and other industries. (FURN)
Table 2
Tari® Data (%)
Nominal Tari® Rates (NTR) E®ective Tari® Rates (ETR)
ID 1993 1997 2000 2004 ¢ e ¢ 1993 1997 2000 2004 ¢ e ¢
(04-93) (04-93) (04-93) (04-93)
FBT 1 25.97 14.07 14.60 11.70 (14.27) (11.33) 96.03 51.076 45.37 38.42 (57.61) (29.38)
TEX 2 52.18 36.98 29.14 19.78 (32.40) (21.29) 187.78 131.89 81.08 53.43 (134.35) (46.68)
WPP 3 15.28 7.32 6.51 6.24 (9.04) (7.84) 30.01 13.455 9.16 9.49 (20.52) (15.78)
PetChem 4 13.58 5.20 4.05 3.86 (9.72) (8.56) 30.92 10.251 6.83 6.85 (24.07) (18.38)
NonMet 5 17.42 6.59 6.06 6.15 (11.27) (9.60) 38.47 13.163 11.21 11.70 (26.76) (19.33)
Met 6 13.30 4.95 4.20 3.78 (9.52) (8.40) 23.64 6.802 4.87 4.37 (19.26) (15.58)
EleMach 7 21.16 7.45 7.69 7.15 (14.01) (11.56) 46.02 14.095 14.74 13.84 (32.18) (22.04)
RadTV 8 19.30 2.37 1.75 1.53 (17.76) (14.90) 36.03 -2.71 -2.61 -2.42 (38.46) (28.27)
TRANS 9 24.62 15.93 13.65 11.62 (13.00) (10.43) 61.59 40.522 24.82 21.78 (39.81) (24.64)
FURN 10 27.94 9.50 7.75 7.07 (20.86) (16.31) 50.44 15.99 19.89 18.46 (31.98) (21.26)
Wt.Avg. z 19.62 9.35 7.93 6.68 (12.94) (10.82) 47.75 22.72 15.36 12.79 (34.96) (23.66)
St.Dev. 11.44 10.00 7.99 5.27 49.46 39.354 24.74 16.80
¢ = ¿2004 ¡ ¿1993
e ¢ =
¿2004¡¿1993
1+¿1993 . Edwards(2005) argues this measure as more appropriate to capture the magnitude of changes in protection.
zTari®s are weighted by 1993 imports.
Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shendy, Riham (2009). Three Empirical Essays on Trade Reform in Post Apartheid South Africa 
European University Institute 
 
DOI: 10.2870/2745536CHAPTER 1. DO UNIONS MATTER? TRADE REFORM AND MANUFACTURING WAGES
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of Estimated Industry Premiums
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E±ciency Gains from Trade
Reform: Foreign Input Technology
or Import Competition?
2.1 Introduction
The South African (SA) manufacturing sector witnessed dramatic productivity growth be-
tween 1992 and 2000, coinciding with the increase in trade openness (Aron & Muellbauer
2007). In this paper we investigate the impact of tari® reductions on Total Factor Produc-
tivity (TFP) growth in SA using annual data for 28 manufacturing industries and covering
the reform period from 1994 to 2004. We focus on two channels by which tari® cuts can in-
duce productivity enhancement. The ¯rst occurs through the competitive pressures from the
cheaper foreign imports of ¯nal goods, and the second takes place through the technological
di®usion from the more accessible sophisticated imported inputs. We distinguish between
these two channels by considering the di®erential e®ect of reductions in ¯nal output tari®
rates, also known as Nominal Tari® Rates (NTR), and Input Tari® Rates (ITR). Reductions
in NTR should capture the e®ect of increased competition in the domestic market, while
reductions in ITR capture the e®ect of the new technology embodied in the cheaply available
foreign inputs.
A common concern in the empirical literature investigating the e®ect of trade liberalization
on \measured" productivity is the di±culty to distinguish between variations in productivity
(or e±ciency), from the markup squeeze often associated with exposure to free trade policies.
In this paper we extend the existing literature by controlling for the latter, in addition to other
concerns that might contaminate our inference on the e®ect of trade openness on e±ciency
growth. Firstly, we adopt two di®erent econometric techniques to model industry markups
39
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and allow them to vary with changes in levels of protection. We then examine the di®erential
e®ect of reductions in NTR and ITR on productivity growth. This procedure allows us to
isolate productivity gains resulting for reduced price-cost margins from those induced by an
actual increase in e±ciency. The ¯rst technique we employ is based on Hall (1990) and entails
a one step procedure in which we examine the e®ect of the tari®s on TFP growth and on
markups simultaneously. The second procedure, based on Roeger (1995), involves a three
stage estimation framework where we control for the variation in markups due to changes
in tari®s in the ¯rst and second stages prior to estimating the e®ect of tari®s on e±ciency
growth in the third stage. The prime advantage of the latter technique lies in addressing
the endogeneity concerns associated with the Hall approach. Secondly, we control for mis-
measurements of primary inputs by including a proxy for capacity utilization. Additionally,
we account for concerns with respect to the endogeneity of tari®s as suggested by theories of
political economy. Generally it is not easy to ¯nd a good instrument for tari®s. Accordingly
we address this concern by: (1) employing lagged tari®s in our estimations, (2) we include
industry ¯xed e®ects to control for the unobserved time invariant industry characteristics
a®ecting, simultaneously, productivity and tari®s, (3) we show that the structure of the
SA tari® schedule during the reform period provides evidence that industry selectivity and
lobbying were to some extent limited, (4) ¯nally, we argue that SA's new government's liberal
position in 1994 with respect to trade policy was triggered by their plan to reduce consumer
prices and raise industrial e±ciencies through curbing domestic monopoly powers who had
vested interest in the prevalent protectionist policies (Bell 1997). Accordingly more reduced
tari®s were applied to sectors with lower TFP. In light of our results where we ¯nd a negative
coe±cient on the tari® variable, ¯xing for this endogeneity bias will serve to further increase
the magnitude of the negative impact of tari®s on the growth rate of productivity, hence our
¯ndings clearly imply that reductions in ITR induce increases in TFP growth.
Results from this work strongly suggest that it is through reductions in ITR that trade
openness positively a®ects TFP growth. A one percentage point decline in ITR translates to
0.4% increase in productivity growth, compared to an insigni¯cant e®ect of NTR. This ¯nding
implies that the e±ciency di®erence between foreign and domestic inputs had a major e®ect
on productivity gains in SA. We show that this result is robust across our two estimation
procedures. Our ¯ndings are also robust to controlling for: the endogeneity of inputs, tari®s
and the interaction of tari®s and markups; changes in capacity utilization over the business
cycle; to using another measure of capital stock; and ¯nally to employing E®ective Tari®
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Rates (ETR) as an alternative proxy, to NTR, to capture the e®ect of increased import
competition. With regard to the e®ect of tari® reductions on markups, our ¯ndings point to
a decline in market power during the ten year reform period, but this result is not robust
across all speci¯cations. Finally, we note that a prime advantage of our data set is the
availability of data on intermediate inputs. Controlling for the latter in our production
function regressions ensures that the estimated e®ect of tari®s on productivity growth does not
capture the increasing levels of imported materials due to the tari® reductions. Furthermore,
accounting for intermediate input serves to control for the upward bias in markup estimates
stemming from using value added data as opposed to gross output ¯gures (Norrbin 1993,
Hyde & Perlo® 1995, Basu 1995).
The theoretical trade literature provides con°icting arguments regarding productivity
gains attributed to trade reform in developing countries. Tybout & Westbrook (1995) out-
line the traditional arguments in support of such gains. Under imperfect competition, trade
openness has scale e®ects as intensi¯ed foreign competition increases the price elasticity of
demand, curbs domestic producers' market power, diminishes their markups, and ultimately
increases \measured" productivity. Additionally increased competition under free trade poli-
cies can boost industry level productivity through the share reallocation e®ect. An industry
wide increase in e±ciency is witnessed if trade reform is associated with an increase in the
market share of the more e±cient ¯rms and the exit of the less e±cient ones. Finally, a resid-
ual e®ect can occur if trade policy positively a®ects ¯rm productivity through unobserved
channels such as innovation or technological progress.
On the other side of the debate, opponents of trade liberalization argue that conditions rel-
evant to developing economies may prevent such gains to materialize. Pavcnik (2002) notes
that gains from scale economies are not common in developing countries where increasing
returns to scale are usually associated with import competing industries. With intensi¯ed
foreign competition such industries are likely to contract. Rodrik (1988) shows that domestic
¯rms are less likely to invest in catch-up technology that would reduce their costs (& increase
their productivity) if trade liberalization decreases their domestic market share without in-
creasing their international sales. Alternatively, foreign competition can negatively a®ect
infant industries when learning by doing is important. Finally, the expected positive e®ect
of increased competition on productivity due to e±cient resource reallocation relies on the
crucial assumption of free entry and exit of ¯rms. Two market features prevalent in devel-
oping countries constitute serious obstacles to gains from such channel. On the one hand,
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the irreversibility of investment in capital equipment impedes the exit of less e±cient ¯rms.
This concern is particularly relevant to countries which do not have well-developed secondary
markets in capital equipment. On the other hand, binding credit constraints are likely to
prevent the entry of new ¯rms and the expansion of the existing e±cient ones.
The empirical literature examining this issue has also failed to provide a consensus on the
nature of the relationship between tari® reductions and productivity gains. Studies investi-
gating the tari® e®ect on productivity growth produces con°icting results. Harrison (1994)
¯nds an insigni¯cant e®ect of tari® cuts on productivity growth in Cote d'Ivoire, while Ty-
bout & Westbrook (1995) ¯nd that tari® reductions decreased productivity growth in Mexico
by worsening scale e±ciency. On the contrary Currie & Harrison (1997) ¯nd a signi¯cant
positive e®ect of tari® reductions on productivity growth in Morocco. This e®ect is also
con¯rmed by ¯ndings from Ferreira & Rossi (2003) and Muendler (2004) for Brazil. The
evidence on the e®ect of tari® cuts on productivity levels seems more consistent as Pavcnik
(2002), Topalova (2004) and Fernandes (2006) ¯nd that tari® reductions were associated with
signi¯cant increases in TFP for Chile, India and Colombia, respectively.
While most of the aforementioned studies investigate the e®ect of tari® reductions on TFP
(growth or level), the empirical methodology employed does not control for the plausible
simultaneous change in markups during the reform period. Ignoring the latter is likely to
produce biased estimates if one wishes to infer on the relationship between trade policy and
e±ciency. In this previous work, results suggesting an increase in TFP during the reform
period can be due to reductions in markups as well as real e±ciency gains. An exception
to the aforementioned work is Harrison (1994) who explicitly models markups by using an
econometric estimation that extends the Hall (1990) approach. Her ¯ndings suggest that
trade openness lowered the price-cost margins, yet this e®ect is insigni¯cant. Using the same
procedure Levinsohn (1993) and Krishna & Mitra (1998) ¯nd that trade openness served to
curtail markups in Turkey and India, respectively. One limitation to the aforementioned three
studies is that they proxy trade openness by a time dummy that captures the reform period,
in this respect the results do not account for the depth and the cross industry variations in
trade policy. Moreover, using time dummies to account for the e®ect of changes in trade
policy is likely to also capture the e®ect of other macro stabilization plans that took place
during the same period. Furthermore, these studies employ balanced ¯rm-level panel data
in this respect results may su®er sample selectivity bias as the sample does not account for
the plausible exit and entry of ¯rms that might be triggered by the changes in trade policy.
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Employing a di®erent methodology based on Roeger (1995) and using ¯rm level data for
European companies, Konings & Vandenbussche (2005) ¯nd that anti-dumping protection
has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on domestic markups.
Another common feature of the previous empirical work is using NTR as the proxy for
changes in trade policy. The mechanism by which tari®s a®ect productivity has received
little attention in this literature. As highlighted in Hallak & Levinsohn (2004), \a focus on
mechanisms rather than just outcomes provides insight into choosing among the di®erent
°avors of trade policy to be able to evaluate when trade policy will be development policy".
Accordingly, a more analytical investigation would entail distinguishing between NTR and
ITR and examining their di®erential e®ects on productivity. On the one hand, reductions
in NTR should re°ect the competition e®ect of free trade policy on domestic production.
Isolating the e®ect of increased foreign competition on markups, e±ciency gains under this
channel would result from the e®ect of competition on decreasing agency costs and eliminat-
ing managerial ine±ciencies. Nickell et al (1997) summarize three channels through which
competition reduces managerial slack. Firstly, a more competitive environment facilitates
owners' ability to monitor managers due to the greater opportunities for comparison which
can lead to sharper incentives. Secondly, increased competition raises the probability of fac-
ing bankruptcy which encourages managers to work harder to avoid such outcome. Thirdly,
as competition raises demand elasticity, the reward to cost reductions increases, this enables
lowering prices, increasing demand, and potentially higher pro¯ts. Alternatively, or simul-
taneously, import competition stimulated by the reduction of NTR may boost the overall
productivity of an industry by forcing ine±cient ¯rms to exit the market. On the other hand,
cuts in ITR increases e±ciency by reducing the costs of foreign inputs. As noted in Ty-
bout (2001), this enables domestic ¯rms to expand their menu of intermediate inputs which
allows each producer to match his input mix more precisely to the desired technology or
product characteristic. Furthermore given the likely better quality-price ratio and advanced
technological knowledge embodied in the imported input, productivity gains can be realized.
Previous work investigating the hypothesis of the positive impact of foreign inputs on pro-
ductivity focuses on testing the direct e®ect of using imported intermediate inputs on the
latter as opposed to employing changes in ITR as a measure for the accessibility to foreign
input. Muendler (2004) ¯nds that foreign inputs played a minor role in productivity change
in Brazil while Kasahara & Rodrige (2005) and Halpern et al (2005) ¯nd that imported inputs
increased plant productivity in both Chile and Hungary, respectively.
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To our knowledge only two papers investigate the di®erential e®ect of NTR and ITR on
\measured" productivity levels. Schor (2004) using data on Brazilian manufacturing ¯rms
¯nds that both increased competition and better access to imported inputs contribute to
productivity gains in roughly the same magnitude. In another study Amiti & Konings (2007),
using a census of manufacturing ¯rms in Indonesia, ¯nd that the positive impact of reductions
in ITR on productivity is three times the positive e®ect of reducing NTR. As noted in Schor
(2004), changes in ITR serve as a better instrument to examine the impact of imported inputs
on productivity due to two reasons. Firstly, imported inputs might be indirectly used by ¯rms
given that most manufacturing inputs usually undergo local remanufacturing. Secondly, the
use of ITR enables directly testing the e®ect of a trade policy instrument as opposed to the
impact of a trade policy outcome.
In this paper we also examine the di®erential impact of reductions in NTR & ITR on
productivity growth in SA. As previously mentioned, the prime contribution of this paper
lies in extending this emerging literature by controlling for a number of concerns. Firstly, we
isolate the e®ect of tari® reductions on e±ciency growth from that on markups. Secondly,
we control for the mis-measurement in primary inputs by accounting for changes in capacity
utilization. Thirdly, we address the issue of tari® endogeneity. And, ¯nally, we control for
intermediate inputs in our production function estimation.
We note that there is a recently growing literature employing ¯rm-level data to investi-
gate the e®ect of tari®s on productivity. Using disaggregated data are superior in controlling
for ¯rm heterogeneities within a sector. This may suggest some limitations associated with
industry level analysis. We believe that sector-level analysis still serves to complement the
aforementioned micro founded work in a number of aspects. Firstly, empirical work based
on ¯rm level data examines the e®ect of an industry level variable (tari®s) on a micro level
outcome (¯rm productivity). Mountlon (1990) points to the bias from regressing a micro level
variable on an aggregate variable due to the presence of intragroup error term correlations.
Secondly, our industry level data are representative of SA's manufacturing sector and covers
the whole reform period, in this respect it alleviates concerns regarding selectivity bias as-
sociated with ¯rm level datasets. This is particularly relevant to studies investigating policy
reform outcomes where it is important to account for sectoral expansions and contractions due
to ¯rm exit and entry. Thirdly, using industry-level real revenue de°ated with the matching
industry-level price de°ators eliminates concerns associated with ¯rm data that stem from
the common procedure of de°ating ¯rm revenues with industry-level price de°ators as op-
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posed to plant-level price data. This limitation to ¯rm data analysis makes it impossible to
di®erentiate between ¯rm productivity di®erences and di®erences in markups. Finally, the
noise attached to input and output ¯rm level data constitutes a further concern. In the case
that this noise is uncorrelated across units, aggregate measures are then perceived to be more
precise.
This paper is divided into four sections. In the next section we present the empirical
methodology. Section 3 describes SAs trade policy and the data. Section 4 discusses our
results. And ¯nally Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
In this section we outline the empirical methodology adopted in this paper to investigate the
e®ect of tari® reductions on TFP growth controlling for the e®ect of the former on markups.
Firstly we present the procedure commonly used in the empirical literature to investigate the
relationship between tari®s and productivity and we brie°y outline its limitations. Secondly,
we model the relationship between tari®s and productivity growth using the Hall (1990)
framework which allows a distinct modeling for the tari® e®ect on markups. We also present
an extension to the latter methodology which allows an estimation procedure that does not
require approximating an unobserved user cost of capital (Harrison 1994). In both settings we
account for °uctuations in capacity utilization over the business cycle thus controlling for the
bias attributed to the mis-measurement of inputs. Finally, given the plausible endogeneity bias
associated with controlling for the e®ect of tari®s on markups under the previous techniques,
we adopt the Roeger(1995) framework to address this concern.
2.2.1 The Common Approach
We start by assuming a production function for gross output in an industry (j) at time (t)
of the following form:
Yjt = AjtF(Kjt;Ljt;Mjt) (2.1)
Y;K;& M are the quantities of output, capital and intermediate input, respectively, proxied
by their real values. L is labor employment and A is the industry speci¯c index of Hicks-
neutral technical progress or TFP. Taking logs of both sides 1 and then di®erentiating with
1Lower case letters indicate log variables, y = log(Y ).
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respect to time we can re-express (1) as:
dyjt = "kdkjt + "ldljt + "mdmjt + dajt (2.2)
where dy;dk;dm denote the annual growth rates in the real output, capital and intermediate
input, dl is the growth rate of employment, "z is the elasticity of output Y with respect to
an input Z, and da is the growth in TFP.
The commonly adopted procedure to estimate the impact of tari®s on productivity growth
(or level) is to proceed in a two stage estimation framework. In the ¯rst stage a productivity
estimate is derived and in the second stage the latter is regressed on tari®s. There are two
alternative approaches to the ¯rst stage of the estimation strategy. The ¯rst is to compute
productivity as the Solow residual which imposes the assumption of perfect competition and
approximates output elasticities by factor shares. A prime shortcoming to this accounting
decomposition is that it produces biased estimates in the presence of imperfect competition.
The second approach is to treat equation (2) as a regression equation, estimate the three elas-
ticity parameters and compute TFP as the regression residual. Despite the attractiveness
of this procedure, and as highlighted in Basu & Fernald (2001), it involves the estimation of
three parameters for output elasticities using data that often su®er multi-collinearity and are
subject to di®ering degrees of endogeneity and thus OLS biases. Additionally the instrumen-
tal variable (IV ) literature, which provides a partial solution to this problem, suggests the
increasing problems of the IV approach in the presence of multiple endogenous variables. A
crucial limitation to this estimation procedure is with regard to the estimated residual which
captures both changes in markups and changes in e±ciency. Accordingly a positive impact of
tari® reductions on the residual can be attributed to either an increase in e±ciency or merely
a reduction in markups. Finally it is important to highlight that the robustness of the results
in the second stage highly depends on the e±ciency by which all three elasticity parameters
are estimated in the ¯rst stage.
2.2.2 The Hall Technique
Hall (1990) provides a framework that allows one to address the above concerns. The main
problem regarding the estimation of markups arises from the fact that while prices are mea-
surable, marginal costs are unobserved. The Hall technique explicitly models markups by
exploiting short-run °uctuations in output and production inputs. Employing this procedure
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enables one to empirically disentangle the e®ect of trade policy on e±ciency from that on
market power. Additionally, the Hall procedure is preferable to a regression estimation of
(2) as it requires estimating only one parameter of the production function, the markup, as
opposed to three input parameters. This feature increases e±ciency and produces better IV
estimates.2
Under monopolistic competition ¯rms charge a price that is a markup, ¹, over marginal
cost. The ¯rst order condition for pro¯t-maximization under imperfect competition implies
that dY
dZ = ¹PZ
PY for an input Z. Multiplying both sides by the input-output ratio Z
Y we can
re-express the elasticities in (2) as a markup multiplied by each input's share in gross output:
dyjt = ¹[®kdkjt + ®ldljt + ®mdmjt] + dajt (2.3)
where ®l & ®m are the shares of nominal labor remuneration and intermediate inputs, respec-
tively, in nominal gross output, computed from the data. To estimate the markup parameter
in equation (3) we face three concerns. The ¯rst concern is with regards to calculating the
capital factor share ®k = rPKK
PY Y where PKK & PY Y are nominal capital stock and gross
output respectively. To compute the latter ratio one needs to estimate an unobserved user
cost of capital, r. In line with other work (Aghion et al 2006, Fedderke et al 2005, Ferreira &
Rossi 2003, Gri±th et al 2005, Oliveira et al 1996) we approximate r by the long run nom-
inal interest rate less expected in°ation plus depreciation.3 A second problem in estimating
equation (3) concerns the computational choice of the factor shares. One option would be
to assume shares that are constant over time and compute average shares which represent
steady state values. Alternatively, one can allow factor shares to vary period-by-period and
adopt the Tornquist approximation,
®t+®t¡1
2 , which relaxes the assumption of constant output
elasticities. Basu & Fernald (2001) thoroughly argue the pros and cons of each technique.
Following their work we also use the former approximation. The third concern which is com-
mon in production function estimations is the endogeneity of inputs. Inputs and output are
simultaneously determined by the ¯rm, accordingly the technical change term, da, is cor-
related with the choice of inputs. Ignoring the latter leads to biased OLS estimates. The
2As noted in Basu & Fernald (2001) and as will be discussed, this advantage comes at a cost of imposing a
pro¯t maximization assumption. This is a relatively weak condition that one expects to approximately hold.
3For the interest rate we use ten year government bond yields. Expected in°ation is based on the CPI and
is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter. The depreciation rate is set to 10% which is equivalent to an
average service life of 10 years. Our results are also robust to using a rate of 5%. Due to the lack of data we
are unable to construct a sector speci¯c user cost of capital similar to that used in Hall (1990).
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common approach to overcome this problem is to use IV s that are correlated with inputs but
independent from any demand or productivity shocks that a®ect the ¯rm. Following Arellano
& Bond (1991) we use lagged values of k, l & m as IVs. In light of the above framework we
allow tari®s to a®ect both markups and TFP and proceed to our ¯nal estimating equation:
dyjt = ¹[dxjt] + ¹ETR[ETRjt ¤ dxjt] + °NTRNTRjt + °ITRITRjt + °j + °t + d´jt (2.4)
where dx refers to the term in the bracket in equation (3) capturing the growth in input
weighted by their respective shares in gross output. If the manufacturing sector in SA exerts
market power then we expect our estimate of ¹ to exceed one. To allow markups to vary
with protection and given that we are concerned with the e®ect of changes in total protection
on markups, we control for an interaction between dx and E®ective Tari® Rates (ETR). The
latter measure of tari®s combines the net e®ect of both NTR and ITR on an industry; in this









where ¿j is NTR in an industry j, ¿i is NTR in an industry i, bij is the free trade technical
coe±cient constructed from the input-output table and measures the share of an input i in the
cost of an output j at free trade prices4, and bij¿i is the ITR facing an industry j. We expect
¹ETR to be positive if higher protection is associated with higher industry market power. The
coe±cients on the NTR and ITR in equation (4) capture the e®ect of increased import compe-
tition and the impact of increased access to foreign inputs, respectively, on e±ciency growth.
In our estimation we use one period lags of NTR, ITR and ETR. In line with Fernandes (2006)
& Topalova (2004) we estimate the e®ect of lagged tari®s rather than contemporaneous values
to account for the possibility that productivity adjustments may not occur instantaneously.
Furthermore the latter speci¯cation partially alleviates concerns regarding the endogeneity of
protection. If productivity growth increases due to reductions in either NTR and ITR, then
°NTR and °ITR should be negative. Finally, we control for industry ¯xed e®ects, °j, to allow
for sector speci¯c markups and technologies that are constant over time. Industry dummies
also serve to control for the plausible endogeneity of tari®s as they capture the unobserved
time invariant industry characteristics a®ecting, simultaneously, productivity and tari®s. We
4The unobserved free trade coe±cient is de¯ned as: bij = ^ bij ¤
1+¿j
1+¿i , where ^ bij is the observed value of an
input i in the gross value of an output j, under protection.
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also include time ¯xed e®ects, °t, to capture period related macroeconomic factors such as
privatization or any other stabilization plans.
The Harrison Extension
To check the robustness of our results and to ensure that our ¯ndings are not contaminated
by a plausible mis-approximation of the user cost of capital, r, we employ the methodology
of Harrison (1994) which extends the Hall procedure. The technique exploits the feature
that the scale elasticity parameter, ¯, is the sum of the elasticities of output with respect to
inputs. Using the pro¯t maximization ¯rst order condition, "z = ¹®z, we can substitute ®K
in equation (3) by (
¯
¹ ¡ ®l ¡ ®m). With some algebraic manipulation we obtain estimation
equation (6) which entails estimating a markup, ¹, and a scale parameter, ¯:
dyjt = ¹[®ld e ljt + ®mdg mjt] + ¯dkjt + dajt (2.6)
e l & e m are equal to ln( L
K) & ln(M
K ) respectively, and dy & dk are the growth rates in real
output and capital stock. Allowing for trade policy to a®ect e±ciency growth and markups,
similar to equation (4), our ¯nal estimating equation under this scenario is:
dyj;t = ¹[df xjt]+¹ETR[ETRjt¤df xjt]+°NTRNTRjt+°ITRITRjt+¯dkjt+°j+°t+d´jt (2.7)
Controlling for Capacity Utilization
The models presented in the previous sections are based on the assumption that we correctly
observe capital services K and labor input L. An additional source of bias in the assessment
of the tari®-productivity relationship comes from the plausible mis-measurement of inputs.
In practice labor and capital input may °uctuate as capacity utilization changes over the
business cycle. Under such condition the observed number of workers and quantity of capital
do not re°ect the intensity of factor use. To account for the latter, under the Hall estimation
we adopt the technique outlined in Basu & Fernald (2001), originally attributed to Flux
(1913). We break intermediate input into two components, the °ow of energy input (E) and
all the other intermediate input (O), and we extend (3) to:
dyjt = ¹[(®k + ®e)dejt + ®ldljt + ®odojt] + dajt (2.8)
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where e is log(E); log of the real value of inputs of Electricity, Gas and Water. To control
for capacity utilization in the Harrison framework and similar to Harrison (1994) we model
capital services as equal to K*E. Accordingly in equation (6) e l & e m are rede¯ned as equal
to ln( L
K¤E) & ln( M
K¤E) respectively, and dy & dk are the growth rates in Y & (K ¤ E),
respectively.5
2.2.3 The Roeger Technique
In Section 2.2 we presented a one-step estimation procedure in which we examine the e®ect of
trade openness on productivity growth and on mark-ups simultaneously. We address the issue
of the endogeneity of inputs by considering lagged values of k, l & m as IVs for dx. With regard
to equations (4) & (7), it is not clear in the IV literature how to instrument for the interaction
of dx and ETR. This implies that our previous results might su®er endogeneity bias. In this
section we outline an alternative three stage procedure that accounts for the latter concern. In
principle this procedure is similar to the traditional two-stage estimation technique in Section
2.1 in which the production function residual from the ¯rst stage is regressed on the tari®
variable in the second stage; yet di®erently this technique allows controlling for the variation
in markups due to changes in ETR in the ¯rst and second stages prior to estimating the e®ect
of tari®s on e±ciency growth (the residual) in the third stage.
In the ¯rst stage we employ the Roeger(1995) methodology which estimates markups while
overcoming the identi¯cation problems arising from the correlation between inputs and the
error term. Under the assumptions of constant returns to scale (CRS), perfect competition,
and the absence of labor hoarding or capital under-utilization, both the residuals from the
production function (Solow Residual-SR) in equation (9), and the price-based residual from
the cost function (Dual Solow Residual-DSR) in equation (10) are highly correlated, where
B is the Lerner index (1 ¡ 1
¹) and p, q & r are log prices of Y , L & K respectively. Under
the assumption of constant returns to scale, Roeger (1995) shows that a lack of correlation
between the SR & the DSR is a consequence of positive markups rather than the presence of
¯xed factors of production.
5Unfortunately we do not have data on labor input in hours thus we can not control for the variation of
labor intensity across the business cycle. We hypothesize that our energy proxy will also capture the latter
particularly given our emphasis on the manufacturing sector.
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SR = dyjt ¡ ®ldljt ¡ ®mdmjt ¡ (1 ¡ ®l ¡ ®m)dkjt = B(dyjt ¡ dkjt) + (1 ¡ B)dajt (2.9)
DSR = ¡[dpjt ¡ ®ldwjt ¡ ®mdqjt ¡ (1 ¡ ®l ¡ ®m)drjt] = ¡B(dpjt ¡ drjt) + (1 ¡ B)dajt (2.10)




Rearranging (11) we obtain (12) and we can directly estimate the markup, ¹, by simple
OLS:
dzjt = ¹[dhjt] (2.12)
where:
dzjt = d(y + p)jt ¡ d(k + r)jt (2.13)
dhjt = [®ld(l + w)jt + ®md(m + q)jt ¡ (®l + ®m)d(k + r)jt] (2.14)
d(y + p), d(l + w) & d(m+q) are the log change in nominal gross output, labor costs and
intermediate input respectively, d(k+r) is the log change in the users cost of capital multiplied
by nominal capital. Note that the Roeger technique is based on the assumption of constant
returns to scale. Oliveira et al (1996) show that if the latter assumption is dropped, the
estimated markup, b ¹, captures the ratio of markup to the scale elasticity parameter (b ¹ =
¹
¯).
Thus in the case of increasing returns to scale b ¹ should be interpreted as the lower bound value
of the markup. In Section 4 we will show that results from using the Harrison procedure yield
an estimate of the scale parameter, b ¯, that is not statistically di®erent from one, indicating
the presence of constant returns to scale. This implies that the coe±cient b ¹ estimated under
this methodology is most likely an unbiased estimate of the markup. In the context of our
work we allow the markup to vary with changes in lagged ETR and we estimate equation
(15) by OLS:
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dzjt = ¹[dhjt] + ¹ETR[dhjt ¤ ETRjt] (2.15)
dyjt = ¹[dxjt] + ¹ETR[ETRjt ¤ dxjt] + dºjt (2.16)
In the second stage we compute an adjusted Solow Residual. We substitute our estimates
of ¹ & ¹ETR obtained from (15) in equation (16) and we simply compute e±ciency growth as
the residual dºjt. Di®erent from the residual dajt from regression equation (3), dvjt captures
productivity growth net of the e®ect of total protection, proxied by ETR, on markups. In
the third stage we regress the computed dºjt on the lag of NTR & ITR, time dummies and
industry dummies. 6
2.3 South Africa: Trade Policy and the Data
Up until the 1970s SA was ¯rmly oriented towards import substitution industrialization. The
latter consisted of a wide-ranging system of quantitative restrictions as opposed to tari®-based
protection. The ¯rst shift away from this trade regime came in 1972 with the relaxation of
quantitative restrictions and the introduction of an Export Development Assistance scheme;
however the overall trade policy remained protectionist. Starting in 1985 and as quotas were
replaced by equivalent import tari®s, SA faced balance of payment pressures arising from
the debt crisis and from capital out°ows due to foreign disinvestment and sanctions. In an
attempt to maintain current account surpluses in excess of the required foreign debt, SA's
government imposed import surcharges. The latter led to an increase in tari® rates thus
o®setting the e®ects of the relaxations of quotas. Belli et al. (1993) ¯nd that by the end of
the 1980s the coe±cient of variation of SAs tari®s was the second highest of 32 developing
countries. In April 1994, the ¯rst post-apartheid government was democratically elected.
This coincided with the initiation of multilateral trade reform as the WTO agreed on the
phase-down tari® plan o®ered by SA in the GATT/WTO Uruguay Round. By signing the
latter agreement the country committed itself to the rationalization of tari® lines, removal
of quotas and export subsidies. Consequently, starting in 1995 SA experienced considerable
cuts in protection rates.7
6Note that we do not control for changes in capacity utilization under this procedure. We believe that this
does not a®ect our results given that controlling for the latter under both the Hall and Harrison procedures
does not signi¯cantly alter our ¯ndings.
7See Bell 1997 for a more detailed description of SA Trade Policy.
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In this paper we measure changes in trade policy using annual applied NTR assembled by
Edwards (2005a). The data covers 28 manufacturing industries at the SIC-3 digit level and
covers the period from 1988 to 2004. We consider the data from 1994 to 2004. Narrowing
down the period under study serves our purposes of investigating SA's performance during
the trade reform period which started in 1994. Furthermore it restricts our analysis to the
particular political time frame of the ¯rst post apartheid regime. Additionally, con¯ning our
analysis to using data from the mid nineties provides a more consistent tari® series as Edwards
(2005a) is unable to estimate the ad valorem equivalent of the Non Tari® Barriers which were
still prevalent in some sectors prior to 1994. This suggests that the computed tari®s prior to
the mid 1990s may be underestimating protection.
While NTR measure protection on ¯nal output, Edwards (2005a) also estimates ETR
which measures the total e®ect of protection on output by accounting for tari®s on ¯nal
output in addition to those imposed on intermediate inputs in an industry. As noted in
Section 2, ITR in an industry j are constructed as a weighted average of NTR on inputs, i,
that enter in the production process of j. The weights are based on cost shares for 42 input
industries.8 For example, if agricultural input accounts for 35% of the food industry gross
output, while other inputs from the food industry and the services sector contribute to 12%
and 15% respectively of the food industry gross output, then the ITR on food is equal to 35%
of the NTR on agriculture plus 12% of the NTR on food plus 15% of the NTR on services, the
latter assumed to be zero since it is a non traded input.9 We note that the level of industry
aggregation used to construct the ITR implies a potential bias in the estimated e®ect of NTR
on productivity as part of the NTR e®ect will operate through our measure of ITR. This will
be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Table 1 summarizes our tari® data. Average NTR & ITR decreased from 26% & 9% re-
spectively in the pre-reform year 1993 to 9% & 3.5% in 2004. The tari® cuts were not uniform
across sectors where industries such as wearing apparel, tobacco and footwear experienced the
highest reductions in NTR, and industries such as wearing apparel, textile, communication
equipment and footwear witnessed the highest cuts in ITR. Notably tari® rationalization was
8As noted in Edwards (2005), the ITR for an industry j is constructed as the weighted average of NTR on
all inputs i used to produce j. The weights are constructed using Input-Output (IO) and Supply-Use (SU)
tables which are reduced to 42 industrial sectors based on the SIC classi¯cation system. ITR for 1988 and
1989 are drawn from the IO tables and ITR for 1993, 1998, 1999 and 2000 are drawn from the SU tables. The
interim years are calculated as a weighted average using the ITR of the two tables that bound the period (with
a linearly declining weight).
9Giving non-traded products a zero tari® rate is in line with Balassa (1965).
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intense in the start of the reform period, leveling out from 1999 as average rates reached less
than 50% of their 1993 pre-reform value (Figures 1). This change in trade policy translated
into signi¯cant increases in trade °ows. In Figures 2 & 3 we plot the trade openness ratio and
real imports respectively. The ¯gures demonstrate the signi¯cant increase in trade volumes
during the reform period compared to the earlier period. In the bottom row of Table 1 we see
the decline in the yearly standard deviations of both NTR and ITR indicating the decreasing
cross industry dispersion of protection rates. The latter is also displayed in Figure 4 which
plots the pre-reform NTR in 1993 against the change in NTR between 1993 and 2004 as
computed in column (5) of Table (1). The downward sloping graph reveals that industries
with initially high levels of protection experienced more severe liberalization measures.10 This
feature of the data implies that industry selectivity reduction or lobbying were to some extent
limited as all tari®s reached similarly low levels.
To estimate productivity we use a panel dataset on gross output, intermediate input,
capital and employment from the South African Standardized Industry Database (Quantec
Research, 2006). The data are provided at the 3-digit SIC classi¯cation for the period from
1970 to 2005. The data are available at both current and 2000 constant prices. A prime
advantage to this data set lies in the ability to control for intermediate inputs in the production
function regression which ensures that the estimated e®ect of tari®s on productivity does not
capture the increasing levels of imported materials due to the tari® reductions. Additionally,
accounting for intermediate input serves to control for the upward bias in markup estimates
stemming from the use of value added ¯gures as opposed to gross output data.
2.4 Results
Table 2 shows results from the three estimation procedures outlined in Section 2. As previ-
ously noted we estimate the e®ect of one period lagged tari®s in order to take into account
that productivity adjustments may not occur instantaneously. Moreover using lags partially
alleviates concerns with regard to the endogeneity of protection. Columns (1) & (2) refer to
the results that arise from using the Roeger procedure in which we control for both the en-
dogeneity of inputs and the endogeneity of the interaction between inputs and ETR. Column
(1) presents the ¯rst stage estimation results from equation (15) from which we estimate a
markup and the impact of ETR on the latter. In column (2) we show the Roeger third stage
10Similar graphs are obtained for ITR and ETR.
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estimation ¯ndings from regressing the computed e±ciency growth (net of the e®ect of tari®s
on the markup), from equation (16), on the tari® variables.
The point estimate of the markup is 1.144 (see columns (1)). The presence of rents in the
South African manufacturing sector is con¯rmed by our test on the coe±cient as we reject the
null of ¹ = 1 at a 5% signi¯cance level (as shown in the bottom row of Table 2). This feature
of market power in SA is well documented in a number of works (Fedderke et al 2006, Aghion
et al 2006, Edwards et al 2005b). With regard to the relationship between total protection
and markups, as captured by the interaction between ETRjt and dxjt, our results support
the idea that industries exercise higher market power under protection.
Regarding the impact of tari®s, the results in column (2) suggest that reductions in ITR
are associated with productivity gains while the e®ects of NTR are insigni¯cantly di®erent
from zero. A one percentage point decline in ITR implies an increase in productivity growth
rate of approximately 0.4%. This result favors the hypothesis that productivity gains are
realized through the decline in input costs which increase domestic producers' access to foreign
intermediate and capital goods. We note that our ¯ndings under the Roeger scenario are not
biased by the assumption of CRS. As will be discussed further on, testing the coe±cient of
the scale parameter, ¯, resulting from the Harrison procedure, we do not reject CRS at a 5%
signi¯cance level. However it is important to note that our ¯ndings might be understating
the contribution of NTR to productivity growth. As noted in Section 3, by construction
and due to the level of industry aggregation used to compute ITR, ITR for an industry j
is likely to also include the NTR applied to that respective industry. Accordingly part of
the e®ect of NTR will indirectly operate on e±ciency growth through our ITR measure. In
other words, the total e®ect of changes in NTR on productivity growth for an industry j
is given by (\ °NTR + (bjj ¤ [ °ITR)). The magnitude of this total e®ect is thus dependent on
the size of bjj, the latter capturing the proportion by which an industry feeds itself with
inputs. Examining the Quantec Input-Output table we ¯nd that the Motor Vehicle and the
Communication Equipment industries are the largest self-feeding sectors, with inputs from
the same industry accounting for 34% and 31% respectively of each industry's gross output,
while the self-feeding rate for 21 of the remaining 26 industries is less than 15%.
Columns (3) & (5) report ¯ndings based on the Harrison technique applied to estimation
equation (7), and columns (4) & (6) refer to the ¯ndings from estimating equation (4) in
which we implement the Hall procedure. In this section we discuss the results when we do
not control for changes in capacity utilization since accounting for such adjustments under
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both the Harrison and Hall procedures, does not signi¯cantly alter our ¯ndings.11 We report
the results from both these techniques given the previously noted advantages to each. On
the one hand, the Harrison technique provides an estimation technique that does not require
approximating an unobserved user cost of capital, r. Additionally it allows estimating the
scale elasticity parameter, ¯, which is crucial to con¯rm the assumption of CRS that un-
derlies the Roeger technique. On the other hand, the Hall technique has the advantage of
estimating only one parameter, namely the markup, thus provides a higher level of estima-
tion e±ciency. Furthermore, the two estimation procedures model the control for capacity
utilization di®erently providing additional robustness checks.
Columns (3) & (4) display the results from the Harrison and Hall estimation procedures,
respectively, without controlling for the endogeneity of inputs. The estimates of both the
markup and the impact of tari®s on e±ciency growth are similar to those reported under
the Roeger procedure. These results are further maintained in columns (5) & (6) in which
we control for the endogeneity of inputs, dxjt, using lagged values of capital, labor and
intermediate inputs. The relevance of our instruments is con¯rmed by the Cragg-Donald test
for weak instruments indicating that the bias in the IV estimator relative to the OLS bias is in
the range of 10% to 20%. Furthermore the Hansen statistic con¯rms the validity of our IVs.
With regard to the relationship between trade protection and the markup, di®erent to columns
(1), results when using the Harrison and Hall estimators imply insigni¯cant coe±cients on
the interaction term reported in columns (3) to (6). Thus, controlling for endogeneity bias
(stemming from the interaction between markups and tari®s), is key for why we ¯nd that the
markup is signi¯cantly a®ected by changes in trade protection.
A notable feature of our ¯ndings is that the Roeger technique yields very similar results
with respect to the e®ect of tari®s on e±ciency growth to those reported by both the Har-
rison and Hall procedures. Moreover, the magnitude of the e®ect of the reductions in NTR
on e±ciency growth is stable across all three methodologies. Using the Roeger procedure,
Edwards (2005b) also ¯nds evidence in support of increased market power under higher levels
of protection. Additionally, Fedderke et al (2006), using industry level data from 1970 to
1997, ¯nd that increased import penetration and export intensity serve to lower markups in
South Africa. On the other hand, Aron & Muellbauer (2007) using aggregate annual time
series data from 1971 to 2005 ¯nd evidence suggesting the slow adjustment of output prices
in the short run. With the increase in trade openness, prices of imports and unit labor costs
11Tables 4 & 5 report the results in which we control for changes in capacity utilization.
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decrease resulting in a net e®ect of a rise in markups before the long run e®ect of increased
competition feeds through. Finally, Aghion et al (2006) show that for the reform period, from
1995 to 2004, the Lerner index for most manufacturing industries did not decline. In light of
this empirical evidence, there does not seem to be a consensus regarding the e®ect of changes
in trade policy on the markup in SA.
To elaborate the extent of our ¯ndings and based on the results from our preferred spec-
i¯cation in column (2), we compute the di®erential e®ect of the period reductions in NTR
and ITR on TFP growth for both the Wearing Apparel and the Tobacco industries which
witnessed the highest period cuts in NTR. With respect to the former industry, the reductions
of 50.44 and 16.86 percentage points in NTR and ITR translate to an insigni¯cant e®ect of
NTR on productivity growth compared to an increase of 7.92% (-0.470*16.86) due to the cuts
in ITR. Yet accounting for the previously mentioned bias in the way ITR are constructed, the
50.44 percentage point reduction in NTR increased the industry's productivity growth rate by
0.20% (-0.470*50.44*0.0084).12 Regarding the Tobacco industry, the reductions in NTR and
ITR of 45.44 and 6.18 percentage points resulted in an increase of 0.05% (-0.470*45.44*0.0023)
and 2.9% (-0.470*6.18) in productivity growth rates, respectively.
A common concern in the empirical work that assess the e®ect of tari®s on productivity
is the endogeneity of protection. In our results we address this concern by, ¯rstly, employing
lagged tari®s in our estimations. Secondly, we include industry ¯xed e®ects to control for the
unobserved time invariant industry characteristics a®ecting, simultaneously, productivity and
tari®s. Third, and as discussed in Section 3, the structure of the tari® schedule suggests that
industry selectivity reductions or lobbying were somewhat limited during the reform period.
Finally, we argue that SA's new government liberal trade policy position in 1994 was triggered
by their plan of raising industrial e±ciencies by curbing domestic monopoly power that had
vested interests in the prevalent protectionist policies. Accordingly lower tari®s were applied
to sectors with lower e±ciency. Given our results where we ¯nd a negative coe±cient on the
tari® variable, solving for this endogeneity bias will serve to further increase the magnitude of
the negative impact of tari®s on productivity growth, and in this respect will further enforce
our ¯ndings that suggest that reduction in ITR induce increases in productivity growth.
In Table 3 we report the e®ect of changes in NTR on productivity growth and we do not
control for the impact of changes in ITR on productivity or the e®ect of ETR on markups.
12Where bjj=0.0084, i.e. 0.84% of the Wearing Apparel industry's gross output is supplied by its own
industry. Similarly, bjj=0.0023 for the Tobacco industry.
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This scenario produces results that are comparable to other ¯ndings in the literature. Our
estimates suggest a signi¯cant negative relation between NTR and productivity growth. A one
percentage point decline in tari®s translates to approximately 0.1% increase in productivity
growth. This ¯nding implies the plausible bias resulting from not controlling for ITR as
productivity gains under this scenario are solely attributed to the competitive pressures from
cheaper foreign imports of ¯nished goods.
So far we discussed results from three di®erent estimation techniques. We also show in
Tables 4 & 5 that our ¯ndings are robust to controlling for capacity utilization. We perform
additional robustness checks. Firstly, to further con¯rm the dominant e®ect of the reductions
in ITR as a positive predictor of e±ciency growth we repeat our exercise using ETR instead
of NTR, the former being a measure for the e®ect of net competition. We ¯nd that the
positive e®ect of ITR persists while the e®ect of competition, proxied by ETR, is insigni¯cant.
Secondly, we address the quality issue of the employed capital stock data, similar to Edwards




Ij;t¡n(1 ¡ ¾)n¡1 (2.17)
where Ijt is gross investment in sector j at time t de°ated by the ¯xed investment de°ator.
We assume a useful life of capital good of ten years (T = 10) and a depreciation rate of 10%
(¾ = 0:10). Given that we have annual data on Ij from 1970, the computed capital stock
under this procedure begins in 1979 (for our purposes we use the capital stock starting 1994).
Our results are robust to this measure of capital stock.13 Thirdly, we include trade °ow
variables in our estimations, namely: import penetration and export intensity ratios. Finally,
to ensure that our results are not driven by the presence of outliers, we run our regressions
excluding industries that witnessed the biggest reductions in tari® rates. Our results are
con¯rmed under all robustness checks.
2.5 Conclusion
The South African manufacturing sector witnessed dramatic productivity growth between
1992 and 2000, coinciding with increases in trade openness. In this paper we examined the
impact of tari® cuts on TFP growth exploiting industry level data from 1994 to 2004. We
13We do not present the results from these speci¯cation as they do not di®er from those reported.
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identify two mechanisms through which tari® cuts can a®ect e±ciency growth by distinguish-
ing the di®erential e®ect of reductions in Nominal Tari® Rates, which capture the e®ect of
increased foreign competition, and reductions in Intermediate Input Tari®s Rates, which cap-
ture the impact of imported technology. We carefully estimate the e®ect of tari®s on e±ciency
as we employ empirical estimation methodologies that separately control for the variation in
markups attributed to changes in protection levels.
Our ¯nding suggest that the e±ciency di®erence between foreign and domestic inputs
had a major e®ect on TFP gains where it is through the new and sophisticated technology
embodied in the cheaply available imported input that trade openness positively a®ects e±-
ciency growth. A one percentage point decline in ITR translates to 0.4% increase in e±ciency
growth compared to an insigni¯cant e®ect of NTR. This ¯nding is robust across all estima-
tion procedures. It is also robust to controlling for: the endogeneity of inputs, tari®s and the
interaction of tari®s and markups; changes in capacity utilization over the business cycle; to
using an alternative capital stock series; and ¯nally to employing E®ective Tari® Rates (ETR)
as an alternative proxy, to NTR, that captures the e®ect of increased import competition.
Candidate explanations for the insigni¯cant (or small) impact of increased competition on
industry productivity growth are the previously outlined features of developing economies.
The resource reallocation e®ect may not materialize as credit constraints may impede the
expansion of e±cient ¯rms, while the lack of secondary markets for capital goods and the
in°exibility of labor regulations can obstruct the exit of the ine±cient ones. Additionally, the
stringent labor market conditions regarding the hiring and ¯ring of workers can also serve to
block e±ciency gains that can result from the impact of increased competition on reducing
managerial ine±ciencies. It is important to note that in°exible labor markets is a particular
feature of the South African economy in which trade unions play a major role. Alternatively,
and as outlined in Tybout (2000), the e®ect of openness on resource reallocation and on re-
ducing managerial ine±ciencies is more likely to have a static impact, thus may only a®ect
productivity levels as opposed to a®ecting productivity growth. With regard to the e®ect
of tari® reductions on markups, our ¯ndings suggest a decline in market power during the
reform period, yet this result is not robust across all estimations.
The results give rise to some concerns with regard to the impact of trade reform in SA.
There are foregone gains from the implemented free trade policies given that competitive pres-
sures fail to translate to signi¯cant productivity gains or to con¯rmed reductions in markups.
Investigating these issues in more detail would be an interesting avenue for future research.
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Table 2
The E®ect of Reductions in NTR and ITR on Productivity Growth
Dependent Variable: Growth in Real Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scale Parameter (¯) 1.057** 1.164**
(0.035) (0.087)
Markup (¹) 1.144** 1.184** 1.179** 1.206** 1.257**
(0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.086) (0.084)
Lag ETR*dxjt (¹ETR) 0.103* 0.015 0.004 0.039 -0.057
(0.035) (0.032) (0.039) (0.057) (0.074)
Lag NTR 0.025 0.018 0.027 0.028 0.026
(0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060)
Lag ITR -0.470* -0.432* -0.463* -0.450* -0.439*
(0.193) (0.189) (0.190) (0.191) (0.182)
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 0.12 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Estimation Procedure Roeger Roeger Harrison Hall Harrison Hall
IV No No No No Yes Yes
Test of IV Identi¯cation:
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.147 0.151
Cragg-Donald (CD) F-Statistic 6.345 8.928
CD Critical Value (% relative bias) 8.78(10%) 9.08(10%)
CD Critical Value (% relative bias) 5.91(20%) 6.46(20%)
Test of Coe±cients (p-value):
Constant Return Scale, H0 : ¯ = 1 0.110 0.061
Market Power, H0 : ¹ = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.002
Table 3
The E®ect of Reductions in NTR on Productivity Growth
Dependent Variable: Growth in Real Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scale Parameter 1.055** 1.166**
(0.036) (0.089)
Markup 1.170** 1.189** 1.182** 1.236** 1.254**
(0.025) (0.033) (0.033) (0.081) (0.074)
Lag NTR -0.098* -0.100* -0.098* -0.096* -0.096*
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Observations 308 308 308 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 0.11 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Estimation Procedure Roeger Roeger Harrison Hall Harrison Hall
IV No No No No Yes Yes
Test of IV Identi¯cation:
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.143 0.143
Cragg-Donald (CD) F-Statistic 5.915 9.738
CD Critical Value (% relative bias) 8.78(10%) 13.91(5%)
CD Critical Value (% relative bias) 5.91(20%) 9.08(10%)
Test of Coe±cients (p-value):
Constant Return Scale, H0 : ¯ = 1 0.128 0.062
Market Power, H0 : ¹ = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + signi¯cant at 10%;*signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
All regressions include time and industry dummies.
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Table 4
The E®ect of Reductions in NTR and ITR on Productivity Growth
(with capacity utilization control)
Dependent Variable: Growth in Real Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Scale Parameter 1.028** 1.072**
(0.028) (0.059)
Markup 1.111** 1.107** 1.126** 1.167**
(0.045) (0.032) (0.090) (0.077)
Lag ETR*dxjt 0.023 0.005 0.042 -0.041
(0.023) (0.037) (0.031) (0.065)
Lag NTR 0.019 0.013 0.016 0.011
(0.062) (0.064) (0.059) (0.060)
Lag ITR -0.419* -0.403* -0.389* -0.382*
(0.185) (0.191) (0.181) (0.180)
Observations 308 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Estimation Procedure Harrison Hall Harrison Hall
IV No No Yes Yes
Tests of IV Identi¯cation:
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.576 0.145
Cragg-Donald (CD) F-Statistic 4.959 9.448
CD Critical value (% relative bias) 5.91(20%) 9.08(10%)
CD Critical value (% relative bias) 4.79(30%) 6.46(20%)
Test of Coe±cients (p-value):
Constant Return Scale, H0 : ¯ = 1 0.307 0.221
Market Power, H0 : ¹ = 1 0.013 0.009 0.160 0.030
Table 5
The E®ect of Reductions in NTR on Productivity Growth
(with capacity utilization control)
Dependent Variable: Growth in Real Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Scale Parameter 1.030** 1.075**
(0.028) (0.059)
Markup 1.120** 1.110** 1.162** 1.164**
(0.043) (0.029) (0.085) (0.069)
Lag NTR -0.096* -0.096* -0.094* -0.095*
(0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034)
Observations 308 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Estimation Procedure Harrison Hall Harrison Hall
IV No No Yes Yes
Tests of IV Identi¯cation:
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.374 0.136
Cragg-Donald (CD) F-Statistic 5.025 10.27
CD Critical value (% relative bias) 5.91(20%) 13.91(5%)
CD Critical value (% relative bias) 4.79(30%) 9.08(10%)
Test of Coe±cients (p-value):
Constant Return Scale, H0 : ¯ = 1 0.296 0.207
Market Power, H0 : ¹ = 1 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.018
Robust standard errors in parentheses, + signi¯cant at 10%;*signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
All regressions include time and industry dummies.
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Figure 4: Tari®s on Final Output (NTR)
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Heterogenous Trade Barrier E®ects:
What Can We Learn from a
Disaggregated Gravity Model?
3.1 Introduction
It is common practice in the gravity literature is estimate the elasticity of trade °ows with
respect to trade barriers using aggregate data. If the sectoral responses to changes in trade
barriers are heterogenous, results from aggregate estimates may be biased. In this paper,
using bilateral trade °ow data between South Africa (SA) and approximately 160 trading
partners for 28 manufacturing industries and covering the period from 1995 to 2004, we test
two hypotheses that predict heterogenous impact of trade barriers. We examine two sources
of heterogeneity: variations in the degree of ¯rm heterogeneity in size across sectors, and
di®erences in the export size of the trading partners. We investigate whether the negative
impact of trade barriers on trade °ows is higher for sectors with more homogenous ¯rms and
is lower for larger trading partners. The results con¯rm these predictions. We ¯nd that the
negative elasticity of SA's exports to trade barriers is higher for sectors with a larger level of
¯rm homogeneity, while the elasticity of imports to trade barriers is lower for larger trading
partners.
Anderson and Wincoop (2004) highlight the bias that stems from estimating trade costs
using aggregate data when trade costs vary at the disaggregated level. They note that \while
aggregation bias can theoretically arise in many di®erent ways, little is known about the em-
pirical magnitude of the bias. One obvious recommendation is to disaggregate." We highlight
some of the documented sources of aggregation bias. The ¯rst emerges from the assumption
imposed on the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The underlying premise in estima-
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tions based on aggregate data is that there is a common elasticity of substitution for all goods,
an assumption unlikely to hold in the real world. Secondly, aggregation bias can be due to
zero bilateral trade °ows between country pairs. Sectoral data reveal a large number of zero
observations in cross border pairs in comparison to aggregate data. Ignoring these zeros leads
to an over estimation of the impact of trade barriers. Finally, industry structural di®erences
can be an additional source of bias. As noted in Haveman et al (2003) \using disaggregated
data mitigates speci¯cation error due to structural di®erences in determinants of trade °ows
across commodities."
In the ¯rst part of this study we test the hypothesis that the impact of trade barriers
on SA's exports is larger in more homogenous sectors. Chaney (2008), who extends the
Krugman (1980) model to allow for ¯rm heterogeneity in productivity and ¯xed costs of
exporting, shows that the negative impact of trade barriers on trade °ows is magni¯ed for
more homogenous sectors, the latter de¯ned as sectors where large productive ¯rms represent
a smaller fraction of ¯rms, as opposed to heterogenous sectors in which large productive ¯rms
account for a larger fraction of ¯rms. In the model, reductions in trade barriers raise each
¯rm's exports (intensive margin), moreover new ¯rms start exporting (extensive margin).
This adjustment in the extensive margin is quantitatively important. In more homogenous
sectors, large productive ¯rms represent a smaller fraction of ¯rms. Given a change in variable
trade costs, the productivity threshold moves in a region where most of the mass of ¯rms exist.
In those sectors, aggregate exports are sensitive to changes in trade costs because many ¯rms
exit and enter as variable costs °uctuate. To test this prediction we employ a gravity model
using SA's bilateral exports as our dependent variable. We use the C5% Index derived in
Fedderke & Naumann (2008) as our proxy for sectoral homogeneity. This measure of industry
concentration denotes the cumulative percentage of output accounted for by the dominant
5% of ¯rms. A higher value indicates a more concentrated and, hence, a less competitive
sector. We believe that this measure represents a good proxy for sectoral homogeneity given
that the distribution of ¯rm size is shaped by the degree of competition.
In the second part of the paper we test whether the elasticity of SA's imports to trade
barriers depends on the size of the exporting partner. In models with ¯xed costs of exporting
(Romer, 1994), the impact of trade barriers is inversely related to the size of the market in the
trading partner country. Haveman et al (2003) show that in the presence of country speci¯c
¯xed costs, trade is compressed into fewer partners than would otherwise occur in the absence
of trade barriers. Testing this compression e®ect for multilateral tari®s, they ¯nd that higher
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multilateral tari®s shift trade towards importing from larger potential exporters. They argue
that this can be due to the objective of minimizing ¯xed costs of trading that is related to the
number of countries with which the importer trades, a goal that may dominate any preference
for variety. In line with their work, we use the trading partners' world exports to capture
its export potential. Using SA's bilateral imports as our dependent variable in the gravity
model, we test for the asymmetric e®ect of trade barriers attributed to the heterogeneity in
partners' export size.
To examine the above mentioned hypotheses we exploit annual trade °ow data for 28 man-
ufacturing industries in South Africa covering the post apartheid period from 1995 to 2004.
We ¯nd that the elasticity of SA's exports to trade barriers is higher for more homogenous
sectors, while the elasticity of SA's imports to trade barriers is lower for trading partners
with larger export potential. We note that our ¯ndings are robust across two estimation
procedures, the Tobit and the Heckman Sample Selection Model.
This paper is divided into four sections. In the next section we present the empirical
methodology. Section 3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 4 discusses our results,
Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
The simplest form of the gravity model states that bilateral trade °ows between two coun-
tries is positively related to the product of their GDPs and inversely proportional to their
distance. The model extends to include other observable characteristics that proxy trade
barriers between the countries (e.g. common language, geographic isolation, common bor-
der). Lacking a theoretical foundation, this model was ¯rstly applied to international trade
by Tinbergen(1962), Poyhonen(1963) and Linneman(1966). The model performs well empir-
ically, providing sensible parameter estimates and explaining large parts of bilateral trade.
Economic theory caught up with the empirical evidence giving rise to number of theoretical
models that predict the gravity model (see Feenstra 2004, Anderson and Wincoop 2003 for
recent surveys). The baseline speci¯cation of the gravity model we adopt in this study is as
follows:
Tradejtk = ®1GDPjt + ®2GDPCjt + ¯1Hj + ®t + ®k + ´jtk (3.1)
where Tradejtk is the logarithm of trade of good k in year t between SA and trading partner j.
Depending on the question studied, we employ exports or imports as the dependent variable.
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GDPjt is the logarithm of GDP of trading partner j in year t. This variable captures the
market size e®ect of the partner country. GDPCjt is the logarithm of GDP Per Capita in
country j to account for di®erences in standards of living. Hj is a matrix of trade barriers
relating SA to country j. We focus on three barriers that are shown robust in the literature
namely: distance between countries, a dummy if they share a common language and a dummy
if j is landlocked. We also include industry dummies, ®k, to control for the time invariant
industry speci¯c characteristics such as the elasticity of substitution. Moreover we include
time dummies, ®t, to capture period related macroeconomic factors that are common across
sectors. Given our focus on SA's trade patterns, we do not control for its own GDP or GDPC
in our regressions. The impact of these variables are captured by the time controls.
A common challenge in the empirical estimation of the gravity model is how to deal
with zero bilateral trade °ows. A wide-spread practice is to perform OLS estimation on the
positive trade °ows, ignoring the zero observations. If zero °ows do not occur randomly,
the latter technique will deliver biased estimates and the e®ect of trade barriers, being a
plausible force underlying this missing trade, is underestimated. Acknowledging that the
zero dependent variables carry information that ought to be included in the estimation calls
for other econometric procedures that speci¯cally address censored data. Given that trade
values are bounded from below by zero, the appropriate estimation procedure is a Tobit
model. This speci¯cation is used in a number of works (e.g. Rose(2004), Soloaga and Winters
(2001), Anderson and Marcouiller(2002) and Venables(2004)). An alternative technique often
employed in the literature is the two-stage Heckman(1979) Sample Selection Model. The ¯rst
stage entails a probit equation that determines the decision of a country pair to trade or
not. The second stage involves modeling the observed positive trade °ows, augmenting the
regression with the inverse Mills ratio from the ¯rst stage to account for selection bias. Due
to the lack of a theoretically motivated exclusion restriction in the former stage, both stages
in the Heckman procedure have the same speci¯cation. Accordingly the non linearity of the
Mills ratio is the only source of identi¯cation. In this paper we report ¯ndings from both
the latter techniques. We consider the Tobit results to be our preferred speci¯cation in light
of the aforementioned weakness of identi¯cation in the Heckman procedure. Moreover, we
believe that a Heckman speci¯cation may be more relevant for ¯ner data (e.g. ¯rm level data)
where the decision to trade is more sophisticated and is more likely to be independent from
the decision regarding the volume of trade.
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3.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Heterogenous Trade Barrier E®ects due to Di®erences
in the Level of Sectoral Firm Homogeneity
In this section we outline the empirical speci¯cation to test whether the negative impact of
trade barriers on exports is exacerbated for more homogenous sectors. As previously noted,
our measure of the level of ¯rm homogeneity within a sector is captured by the C5% Index
developed in Fedderke et al (2008). A higher value indicates a more homogenous sector.
Accordingly our empirical model is as follows:
Exportsjtk = ®1GDPjt + ®2GDPCjt + ¯1Hj + ¯2(Hj ¤ CIndextk) + ®k + ®t + ´ (3.2)
where Exportsjtk is ln exports of SA of industry k to country j at year t, estimated in USD
and de°ated by the CPI for the USA. CIndextk is ln(1 + C5%Index). Based on Chaney
(2008) we expect the coe±cient on the trade barrier and the interaction term to have the
same sign.
3.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Heterogenous Trade Barrier E®ects due to Di®erences
in the Level of Trading Partners' Export Potential
To test our second hypothesis, if the negative impact of trade barriers on imports is reduced
for trading partners with larger export potential. Our empirical speci¯cation is:
Importsjtk = ®1GDPjt+®2GDPCjt+¯1Hj+¯2(Hj¤Sizetk)+¯3¿tk+¯4(¿tk¤Sizetk)+®k+®t+´
(3.3)
where Importsjtk is the logarithm of imports of SA of industry k from country j at year
t, estimated in USD and de°ated by the CPI for the USA. Sizejt is equal to the logarithm
of real world exports of country j in year t. ¿tk is the log of (1 + NTRtk) where NTRtk is
Nominal Tari® Rates applied by SA on imports of good k in year t. Our hypothesis suggests
that the coe±cient on the trade barriers and the interaction term have opposite sign.
We note the concern of simultaneity bias in the above estimation with respect to the tari®
variable. Higher levels of imports may be driving higher tari® rates. We dismiss this concern in
our estimation in light of SA's new government liberal trade policy position in 1994 which was
triggered by their plan of raising industrial e±ciencies by curbing domestic monopoly power
that had vested interests in the prevalent protectionist policies (Bell 1997). Accordingly the
trade policy, as stated, is independent of the level of industry trading activities. Moreover, we
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believe that industry ¯xed e®ects in our estimation control for the unobserved time invariant
industry characteristics a®ecting, simultaneously, imports and tari®s.
3.3 The Data
We study bilateral trade °ow data for the manufacturing sector provided by Quantec. The
data are disaggregated to 28 industries at the SIC-3 digit level and covers trade with 160
partners (excluding countries with population size less than one million inhabitants). Our
period starts in 1995 after the ¯rst post-apartheid government was democratically elected.
Our starting year ensures that all sanctions had been lifted, furthermore it restricts our
analysis to the particular political time frame of the ¯rst post apartheid regime.
As previously mentioned, to test the ¯rst hypothesis we use the C5% Index from Fedderke
et al. (2008) as our measure of the level of ¯rm heterogeneity within a sector. The index is
computed as the percentage of output accounted for by the dominant 5% of ¯rms. A higher
value indicates a more concentrated sector with a lower level of competition. Given that the
size distribution of ¯rms is shaped by the degree of competition we believe that this proxy
is a fair representation of sectoral homogeneity as de¯ned in Chaney (2008). The data are
provided for 23 of the 28 sectors. The C5% Index shows considerable variation across the 23
sectors ranging from a maximum of 85% for the motor vehicle industry in 1996 to a minimum
of 48% for the textile industry. The average index decreased from 68% in 1996 to 54% in 2001
while the coe±cient of variation increased from 15% to 31%, respectively. Given this data
limitation to only two years, we interpolate the concentration index for 1998 as the average
of the 1996 and 2001 estimates. We use 1996 estimates for the years the from 1995 to 1997,
the 1998 ¯gures also for the year 1999, and we use 2001 ¯gures for the years from 2000 to
2004.1
Regarding the second hypothesis we use tari® data to capture the impact of trade policy
on SA's imports. We employ the Nominal Tari® Rates estimated by Edwards (2005). The
data are provided for the entire period and covers our 28 manufacturing industries. Con¯ning
our analysis to using data from the mid nineties provides a consistent tari® series as the ad
valorem equivalent of the Non Tari® Barriers are estimated for this period. Noteworthy
that for the period under study and given our focus on the manufacturing sector, all trading
partners are subject to Most Favored Nation (MFN) tari® rates, accordingly tari®s vary only
1Our results are also robust to con¯ning our regressions to the years 1996, 1998 and 2001.
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by sector but are common across all countries.2
With respect to the remaining variables, we use ¯gures for GDP and GDP per Capita
from the Penn World Table. Data on country pair trade barriers namely: distance, common
o±cial language and geographic isolation (landlocked), is obtained from the Centre D'Etudes
Prospectives Et D'Informations Internationales (CEPII).
3.4 Results
Table 1 shows the estimation of the model in equation (2). Columns (1) to (4) report results
from our preferred speci¯cation, the Tobit estimator, while columns (5) to (9) display ¯ndings
from the Heckman Sample Selection Model, where column (9) shows the ¯rst stage results
for the selection decison.
Results for the baseline scenario in column (1) are in line with general gravity model
predictions. Both the size and the living standard of the trading partner have a positive
impact on SA's exports, as implied by the positive coe±cients on the GDP and the GDP
per Capita variables. The elasticity estimate of 1.9 suggests that a one percent increase in
partner GDP raises SA's exports by 1.9%. Moreover, both distance and geographic isolation,
the latter depicted by a trading partner dummy if landlocked, have a negative impact on
trade, while sharing a common o±cial language with the trading partner increases SA's
exports. The results concerning the interaction parameter reported in columns (2) to (4)
support the theoretical predictions from Chaney (2008). A higher concentration index (thus
a more heterogenous sector) magni¯es the impact of trade barriers on trade °ows. This is
con¯rmed by the sign on the coe±cient of the interaction between the trade barriers and our
proxy for industry homogeneity, which takes the same sign as that on the relevant barrier. To
quantify the magnitude of our ¯ndings, we compare two sectors, the motor vehicle industry
with a period average concentration level of 81%, to the textile industry with a lower value of
41%. Results for the distance variable suggests that a one percent increase in distance between
SA and its trading partner reduces SA's exports by 2.9% [-2.774+ (-0.267*ln(1+0.81))] for
the former industry and 2.8% [-2.774+ (-0.267*ln(1+0.41))] for the latter. These estimates
2We note that SA's Free Trade Agreements are irrelevant to our sample. September 2000 was the im-
plementation of the South African Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Protocol with little impact
on the manufacturing sector. January 2000 was the implementation of the SA-EU Trade, Development &
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) yet rati¯cation and enforcement of agreement was only in 2004. Finally,
December 2004 marked the Preferential Trade Agreement between the South African Customs Union (SACU)
& MERCOSUR which does not impact our sample period.
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suggest that the asymmetric impact of distance on trade °ows due to variations in sectoral
homogeneity, although signi¯cant, is negligible in magnitude.
In columns (5) to (9) we display the matching results from the Heckman procedure.
Column (9) shows the estimates for the ¯rst-stage selection equation which models the decision
of an industry to export or not. Regarding the second-stage results, displayed in columns (5)
to (8), our estimates for the the distance and landlocked variables are signi¯cant and con¯rm
our earlier ¯ndings of an ampli¯ed impact of trade barriers for more homogenous sectors,
while our results regarding the language barrier are not robust.
Table 2 displays the results from estimation equation (3), for testing the second hypothesis
regarding the compression e®ect of trade barriers. Again, columns (1) to (5) display results
from the Tobit estimation and columns (6) to (11) from Heckman. Given that the dependent
variable in these regressions is imports, we include nominal tari® rates as an additional trade
barrier. One common concern is the simultaneity bias with respect to tari®s. Higher levels of
imports may lead to higher tari® rates. We argue that this is not the case for SA given the
new government's liberal trade policy position which was triggered by their plan of raising
industrial e±ciencies by curbing domestic monopoly power that had vested interests in the
prevalent protectionist policies (Bell 1997). Hence the trade policy, as stated, can meaning-
fully be assumed to be independent of the level of industry trading activity. Moreover, the
industry ¯xed e®ects in our estimations serve to reduce endogeneity concerns as they control
for the unobserved time invariant industry characteristics a®ecting, simultaneously, imports
and tari®s.
As in Table (1), results in Table (2) column (1) are in line with the gravity model pre-
dictions where factors such as the trading partner's GDP and GDPC, and sharing a common
o±cial language with SA increase imports, while distance and being landlocked reduce trade.
With regard to the tari®s barrier, the negative coe±cient indicates that higher protection
decreases imports, yet this e®ect is not signi¯cant. This may be due to the fact that MFN
tari®s, being common across all partners, serve better to explain aggregate industry imports
as opposed to bilateral imports. We note to the results from the Heckman selection equation
in column (11) which suggest that tari®s are a signi¯cant predicator of an industry's decision
to import. With respect to our ¯ndings regarding the asymmetric impact of trade barriers
due to variations in partner export potential, results in columns (2) to (5) highlight the pre-
dicted compression e®ect as the impact of trade barriers on imports is smaller for partners
with larger world export markets. This is con¯rmed by the coe±cient on the interaction
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term which takes a sign opposite to that on the trade barrier. Our ¯ndings are robust for all
trade barriers and under both techniques. Based on our ¯ndings in column (2) we quantify
the extent of our estimates and compare the responsiveness of SA's imports to tari® changes
across the USA and Mauritius, two trading partners with very di®erent export market share.
Our results suggest that a one percent rise in tari®s rates increases exports from the USA to
SA by 2.2% [-13.247+ (0.566*27.27)] while it reduces exports from Mauritius to SA by 1.2%
[-13.247+ (0.566*21.27)]. These ¯ndings are in line with Haveman et al (2003) who argue that
the compression e®ect of multilateral tari®s can be due to the objective of minimizing ¯xed
costs of trading that is related to the number of countries with which the importer trades, a
desire that may dominate any preference for variety. Almost all results are robust under the
Heckman procedure, reported in columns (7) to (10). We note that despite the consistency in
the sign of the coe±cient across both techniques, the magnitude of the estimates considerably
di®er.
3.5 Conclusion
The gravity model is commonly estimated such that the elasticity of trade °ows with respect
to trade barriers is equal across the di®erent sectors and regions. This is the underlying
assumption when gravity estimations are implemented using aggregate trade °ow data. Sup-
ported by economic theory, in this paper we examine two sources of heterogeneity in trade
barriers e®ects attributed to; (1) variations in sectoral level of ¯rm heterogeneity, and (2)
di®erences in trading partner export size.
Using annual bilateral data on exports and imports for South Africa with 160 trading
partner, for 28 manufacturing industries and covering the period from 1995 to 2004, we test
two hypotheses that predict a heterogenous e®ect of trade barriers on trade °ows. Firstly,
we examine if variations in the level of ¯rm heternogeniety across sectors, measured by sec-
toral concentration ratio, implies asymmetric trade barrier e®ects. Secondly, we test if the
heterogeneity in the impact of trade barriers can be attributed to di®erences in the size of
the trading partners, the latter measured by the trading partner's export potential.
The signs on our estimated coe±cients suggest that the negative elasticity of SA's exports
to trade barriers is higher for more homogenous sectors. This result provides support for
international trade models with heterogeneous ¯rms as opposed to those assuming represen-
tative ¯rms. Moreover, we ¯nd that the elasticity of SA's imports to trade barriers is lower
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for trading partners with larger export potential. This evidence highlights the presence of
country speci¯c ¯xed costs related to the number of countries with which the importer (SA)
trades, and the desire to minimize these costs which may dominate any preference for variety.
This can help explain the behavior of some developing countries who focus on exporting a
variety of products from a few industries as opposed to diversifying their product space, a
strategy that makes them big exporters in a small number of industries rather than small
exporters in a big number of industries (Haveman et al. 2003).
Finally, we note that our use of disaggregated industry level data are important not
only because it provides information on sources of asymmetric trade barriers e®ects, but also
because it allows controlling for the aggregation bias that stems from the misrepresentation of
zero bilateral trade °ows in aggregate data. Additionally, it allows for industry ¯xed e®ects,
hence controls for industry speci¯c elasticity of substitution, a reality commonly overlooked
in gravity estimations. We strongly encourage more empirical studies, particularly employing
multinational data, to further support our ¯ndings.
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